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Abstract
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in
particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the
DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue
of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an
assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue
of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this
conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with
DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions.
With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric
disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can
accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do
exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent
the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply
constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of
opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not
try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific
questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
General Introduction
This article has its own history, which is worth recount-
ing to provide the context of its composition.
As reviewed by Regier and colleagues [1], DSM-5 was
in the planning stage since 1999, with a publication date
initially planned for 2010 (now rescheduled to 2013).
The early work was published as a volume of six white
papers, A Research Agenda for DSM-V [2] in 2002. In
2006 David Kupfer was appointed Chairman, and Darrel
Regier Vice-Chairman, of the DSM-5 Task Force. Other
members of the Task Force were appointed in 2007,
and members of the various Work Groups in 2008.
From the beginning of the planning process the archi-
tects of DSM-5 recognized a number of problems with
DSM-III and DSM-IV that warranted attention in the
new manual. These problems are now well known and
have received much discussion, but I will quote the
summary provided by Regier and colleagues:
Over the past 30 years, there has been a continuous
testing of multiple hypotheses that are inherent in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
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fourth (DSM-IV)... The expectation of Robins and
Guze was that each clinical syndrome described in
the Feighner criteria, RDC, and DSM-III would ulti-
mately be validated by its separation from other dis-
orders, common clinical course, genetic aggregation
in families, and further differentiation by future
laboratory tests–which would now include anatomi-
cal and functional imaging, molecular genetics,
pathophysiological variations, and neuropsychologi-
cal testing. To the original validators Kendler added
differential response to treatment, which could
include both pharmacological and psychotherapeutic
interventions... However, as these criteria have been
tested in multiple epidemiological, clinical, and
genetic studies through slightly revised DSM-III-R
and DSM-IV editions, the lack of clear separation of
these syndromes became apparent from the high
levels of comorbidity that were reported... In addi-
tion, treatment response became less specific as
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors were found to
be effective for a wide range of anxiety, mood, and
eating disorders and atypical antipsychotics received
indications for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and
treatment-resistant major depression. More recently,
it was found that a majority of patients with entry
diagnoses of major depression in the Sequenced
Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression
(STAR*D)study had significant anxiety symptoms,
and this subgroup had a more severe clinical course
and was less responsive to available treatments...
L i k e w i s e ,w eh a v ec o m et ou n d e r s t a n dt h a tw ea r e
unlikely to find single gene underpinnings for most
mental disorders, which are more likely to have
polygenetic vulnerabilities interacting with epigenetic
factors (that switch genes on and off) and environ-
mental exposures to produce disorders. [[2], pp.
645-646]
As the work of the DSM-5 Task Force and Work
Groups moved forward, a controversy developed that
involved Robert Spitzer and Allen Frances, Chairmen
respectively of the DSM-III and DSM-IV Task Forces.
The controversy began with Spitzer’s Letter to the Edi-
tor, “DSM-V: Open and Transparent,” on July 18, 2008
in Psychiatric Times [3], detailing his unsuccessful effort
to obtain minutes of the DSM-5 Task Force meetings.
In ensuing months Allen Frances joined him in an
exchange with members of the Task Force. In a series
of articles and blog postings in Psychiatric Times,
Frances (at times with Spitzer) carried out a sustained
critique of the DSM-5 work in which he focused both
on issues of transparency and issues of process and con-
tent [4-16]. The latter involved the Task Force and
Work Group efforts to address the problems of DSM-IV
with changes that, in Frances’ opinion, were premature
and not backed by current scientific evidence. These
changes included new diagnoses such as mixed anxiety-
depression, an expanded list of addictive disorders, the
addition of subthreshold conditions such as Psychosis
Risk Syndrome, and overly inclusive criteria sets - all
destined, in Frances’ judgment, to expand the popula-
tion of the mentally ill, with the inevitable consequence
of increasing the number of false positive diagnoses and
the attendant consequence of exposing individuals unne-
cessarily to potent psychotropic medications. The
changes also included extensive dimensional measures
to be used with minimal scientific foundation.
Frances pointed out that the NIMH was embarked on
a major effort to upgrade the scientific foundation of
psychiatric disorders (described below by Michael First),
and that pending the results of that research effort in
the coming years, we should for now mostly stick with
the existing descriptive, categorical system, in full aware-
ness of all its limitations. In brief, he has argued, we are
not ready for the “paradigm shift” hoped for in the 2002
A Research Agenda.
We should note that as the DSM-5 Work Groups
were being developed, the Task Force rejected a propo-
sal in 2008 to add a Conceptual Issues Work Group
[17] - well before Spitzer and Frances began their online
critiques.
In the course of this debate over DSM-5 I proposed to
Allen in early 2010 that we use the pages of the Bulletin
of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy
and Psychiatry (of which I am Editor) to expand and
bring more voices into the discussion. This led to two
issues of the Bulletin in 2010 devoted to conceptual
issues in DSM-5 [18,19]. (Vol 17, No 1 of the AAPP
Bulletin will be referred to as Bulletin 1, and Vol 17, No
2 will be referred to as Bulletin 2. Both are available at
http://alien.dowling.edu/~cperring/aapp/bulletin.htm.)
Interest in this topic is reflected in the fact that the sec-
ond Bulletin issue, with commentaries on Frances’
extended response in the first issue, and his responses
to the commentaries, reached over 70,000 words.
Also in 2010, as Frances continued his critique
through blog postings in Psychiatric Times,J o h nS a d l e r
and I began a series of regular, DSM-5 conceptual issues
blogs in the same journal [20-33].
With the success of the Bulletin symposium, we
approached the editor of PEHM, James Giordano, about
using the pages of PEHM to continue the DSM-5 dis-
cussion under a different format, and with the goal of
reaching a broader audience. The new format would be
as e r i e so f“essential questions” for DSM-5, commen-
taries by a series of individuals (some of them commen-
tators from the Bulletin issues, others making a first
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mentaries by Frances. Such is the origin of this article.
(The general introduction, individual introductions, and
conclusion are written by this author (JP), the responses
by Allen Frances.
For this exercise we have distilled the wide-ranging
discussions from the Bulletin issues into six questions,
listed below with the format in which they were pre-
sented to commentators. (As explained below, the
umpire metaphor in Question 1 is taken from Frances’
discussion in Bulletin 1.)
1) How to Choose Among the Five Umpires of
Epistemology?
Are DSM diagnoses more like constructs or more like
diseases? We would like to have the positions of each of
the five epistemological umpires stated as clearly as pos-
sible.
Umpire 1) There are balls and there are strikes and I
call them as they are.
Umpire 2) There are balls and there are strikes and I
call them as I see them.
Umpire 3) There are no balls and there are no
strikes until I call them.
Umpire 4) There are balls and there are strikes and I
call them as I use them.
Umpire 5) Don’t call them at all because the game is
not fair.
Could you please state the position of the umpire
which you endorse?
2) What is a Mental Disorder?
It has been difficult to reach agreement on a definition
of mental disorder. Could you comment on this pro-
blem, or offer what you think is an adequate definition
of the concept, mental disorder?
3) What are the Benefits and Risks of
Conservatism?
Given the state of the science of psychiatric disorders,
should we design DSM-5 in a conservative manner, with
minimal change, or do the state of psychiatric science
and the problems in DSM-IV dictate major change?
4) Is Pragmatism Practical?
What roles do science and pragmatism play in the
construction of DSM-5? Does our science allow us to
make major decisions on a scientific basis? What role
do pragmatic considerations play, both when the science
is strong and when the science is weak?
5) How Compatible are All the Purposes of DSM?
Is there a conflict over utility in the DSMs? The
authors of DSM-III, DSM-IV, and DSM-5 intend the
manuals to be useful for both clinicians and researchers.
Is there a conflict between what is useful for clinicians
and what is useful for researchers? Which group is
served better by DSM-III and DSM-IV, and by the pro-
spective changes in DSM-5?
6) Is DSM the Only Way to do Diagnosis?
Given the problems in DSM-III, DSM-IV, and (likely)
in DSM-5, would you argue for an alternative, more
rational diagnostic system than the DSM? Could you
describe it? Would your alternative system simply
replace the DSM or restructure it in a major way?
As will become apparent in what follows, these six
questions are in multiple ways interrelated, and for
that reason a response to one of the questions is often
relevant to another of the questions. This is, for
instance, quite obvious with Questions 1 and 2. What
you think a mental disorder is will affect how you
define the notion of mental disorder. Question 4
quickly enters this discussion. Should pragmatic, in
addition to purely scientific, considerations enter into
your effort to describe and define mental illness?
Under Question 1, for instance, Harold Pincus offers a
“pragmatic” response that could easily be placed under
Question 4.
And now let’s bring in Question 3 - whether to take a
conservative or activist attitude toward changes in
DSM-5. Don’t forget that threading its way through all
of these questions is the dissatisfaction and disappoint-
ment with the scientific status of DSM-III and IV. That
troubled status clearly played a role in the epistemologi-
cal (and ontological) discussion in Question 1, the defi-
nitional issue of Question 2, and the pragmatic aspect of
Question 4. It is emblematic of the complexity of these
discussions that the same troubled state of the current
nosology will lead Scott Waterman in an activist direc-
tion in Question 3 and Michael Cerullo in a conserva-
tive direction.
The final two questions take us in somewhat other
directions, but both are related to the discussions that
precede them. Question 5, about utility, raises major
issues concerning how the manual is actually used, and
for whom it is really designed - again, questions related
to those of scientific status, definition, pragmatic consid-
erations, and finally attitudes toward change. With this
question it’s hard to find anyone wanting to defend the
premise of DSM-III and IV (and apparently DSM-5)
that the manuals are equally useful for clinicians and
researchers.
Finally with Question 6 we have an ultimate question
- whether the current state of the DSMs warrants a
total overhaul. With Ronald Pies we have an individually
imagined overhaul; with Joel Paris we have a commen-
tary on DSM-5’s effort at revision, and with Michael
First’s presentation of the NIMH Research Domain Cri-
t e r i ap r o j e c t( R D o C ) ,w eh a v eN I M H ’s response - that
the diagnostic manuals of the future may not resemble
the DSMs as we know them.
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tion final answers to the questions of psychiatric classifi-
cation. The questions are too large, and our
expectations have to be more modest. What we know is
that the goals of DSM-III & IV have not been achieved
and that we are left with more immediate questions as
to how to proceed with the current revision, DSM-5.
Responses to these questions are understandably mixed.
What we hope from this article is to keep the discussion
going, and perhaps to move it forward a bit.
Finally, because of the total size of this exercise, “The
Six Most Essential Questions In Psychiatric Diagnosis: A
Pluralogue” will be published in four parts: each of the
first three covering two questions and the final part a
general conclusion. Thus this article, Part 1, covers the
first two questions.
Question #1: How do we Choose Among the Five
Umpires of Epistemology?
Are DSM diagnoses more like constructs or more like
diseases? We would like to have the positions of each
of the five epistemological umpires stated as clearly
as possible.
Umpire 1) There are balls and there are strikes and
I call them as they are.
Umpire 2) There are balls and there are strikes and
I call them as I see them.
Umpire 3) There are no balls and there are no
strikes until I call them.
Umpire 4) There are balls and there are strikes and
I call them as I use them.
Umpire 5) Don’tc a l lt h e ma ta l lb e c a u s et h eg a m e
is not fair.
Could you please the position of the umpire which
you endorse?
Introduction
Question #1 involves both ontological and epistemologi-
cal issues: what are psychiatric disorders, and how do
we know them? Framing these questions with the meta-
phor of umpires and balls and strikes comes from Allen
Frances’s response to commentaries in Bulletin 1, “DSM
in Philosophyland: Curiouser and Curiouser.” That
response offered the positions of three umpires: the rea-
list first umpire, the nominalist second umpire, and the
constructionist third umpire. The author sided with
Umpire 2, espousing a nominalist stance to the effect
that he knows that there is real psychopathology out
there but has no guarantee that his diagnostic constructs
sort it out correctly. He wrote: “This brings us to me a
(call’um as I see’um) second umpire. In preparing DSM-
IV, I had no grand illusions of seeing reality straight on
or of reconstructing it whole cloth from my own pet
theories. I just wanted to get the job done - produce a
useful document that would make the fewest possible
mistakes, and create the fewest problems for patients”
(Bulletin 1, p. 22).
For this article we have added two more umpires: a
pragmatist fourth umpire and a fifth umpire who rejects
the entire exercise. We were motivated to add these
umpires by the fact that some of the responses required
them.
Further, we recognize that in asking respondents to
choose one position and defend it, we have made an
unreasonable demand. Why should an individual not
say, I’m a combination of these two umpires, or, I’ma
lot of this umpire and a little of that, or finally, I’ma
first umpire if we’re talking about Huntington’sd i s e a s e ,
but a second umpire if we’re talking about schizoaffec-
tive disorder. So, quite understandably, in some our
r e s p o n s e sw ew i t n e s st h es a m ep r o b l e mw eh a v ew i t h
our diagnoses: comorbidity - in this case epistemological
(or ontologic) comorbidity rather than diagnostic
comorbidity.
In this debate over the nature of psychiatric disorders
we experience a tension among the umpires that reflects
the status of nosologic science. On the one hand our
patients suffer greatly from psychiatric symptoms, and it
seems wildly foolish to theorize away their suffering. On
the other hand our efforts to organize and classify their
suffering can seem arbitrary and confusing. We organize
or categorize a symptom cluster and give it a diagnostic
name, and it overlaps with another cluster. Or a patient
simply has symptoms of both. We start off with the
expectation that there will be a match-up between ther-
apeutic agent and diagnostic cluster, and we discover
that, at the extreme, most of our pharmacologic agents
seem to treat most of our disorders. Finally, we some-
how want to resolve this confusion by getting at the
underpinnings of the identified disorders, and we dis-
cover that the genetics and neuroscience don’t support
our groupings.
In view of this confusion it’s not surprising that opi-
nion divides itself in various ways. Focus on the real suf-
fering out there, along with a conviction that the
diagnostic clusters reflect distinct, real conditions, and
you end up as a first umpire. Focus on that suffering
with uncertainty about the isomorphism between label
and disorder, and you become a second umpire. Switch
your focus onto the arbitrariness of the labeling, and
you end up questioning whether there is anything but
the labeling and become a third umpire. Or switch away
from the issues of these umpires onto the effects of one
label versus another, and you are now a fourth umpire.
Finally, decide that it’s all nonsense, and you are our
fifth umpire.
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Page 4 of 29Commentary: A Game for Every Kind of Umpire (Almost)
Peter Zachar, Ph.D. and Steven G. Lobello, Ph.D.
Auburn University Montgomery Department of
Psychology.
One might think that a philosophical pragmatist
should identify with either the pragmatist or the nomin-
alist position in Allen Frances’sc l e v e ra n a l o g y ,b u tt h a t
isn’t the case. From a pragmatist perspective, philosophi-
cal -isms such as realism, pragmatism, nominalism, and
constructionism are conceptual distinctions that we
make for certain purposes. The question is what infor-
mation or response options are gained from making
t h e s ed i s t i n c t i o n st h a tw o u l dn o tb eg a i n e dw e r eo t h e r
distinctions made.
For example, let’s take the pragmatist’s view that I call
b a l l sa n ds t r i k e sa sIu s et h e m . If taken too literally this
is a recipe for a shallow utilitarianism. One of the ethi-
cal principles of umpires is to try to make the game as
fair as possible - so every batter and pitcher should face
t h es a m es t r i k ez o n e( f o rt h a tu m p i r e ) .A nu m p i r e
should attempt to call the pitches as they are (to the
best of his ability), and not widen the zone for batters
he favors and narrow it for those he does not. Also, in
most games, a degree of unreliability in deciding what
counts as a ball or strike may not matter, but it can
matter a lot in big games. Presumably every psychiatric
patient should be treated like a big game, but with 15
minute medication management sessions that is not
likely the case. So a kind of realist attitude is important
for keeping the game fair. This is true of psychiatric
nosology as well. We should always attempt to classify
the world as it is not how we want it to be. A pragma-
tist would not deny the spirit of this ethic.
Most pragmatists would point out that the purpose of
the strike zone is to assure that the batter has a chance
to hit the ball well enough to get on base. He cannot do
so if the pitch is too high, in the dirt, or wide of the
plate. This makes the strike zone a practical kind. There
are also practical constraints on the strike zone’s loca-
tion that create a kind of objectivity - but beyond that
there is no gold standard. Furthermore, it is not true
that every pitch that goes through the zone on the way
to the catcher is a strike. For example, spit balls have
such unpredictable trajectories that batters have very lit-
tle chance of hitting them, and they are therefore illegal
whether or not they are in the zone. Psychiatry lacks
fixed gold standards as well, and the social implications
of giving a diagnosis that is contrary to the purpose of
diagnosing can also affect whether something is consid-
ered to be an official disorder (e.g., pedophilia).
What of the nominalists who say I call balls and
s t r i k e sa sIs e et h e m ? Perhaps a better way to think
about nominalists is that they deny both that the criteria
for balls and strikes were created by the Platonic
baseball gods and that competent umpires can recognize
what is naturally a ball and naturally a strike. Cousins to
the pragmatist, the nominalists say that what exist are
particular pitches, and we tend to group them into the
ball category or the strike category for various and sun-
dry reasons. Very different pitches like fast balls, curve
balls and sliders can all be strikes. These groupings can
also be altered. For example up until the 1920s the spit
ball was a legitimate pitch (as homosexuality was once
considered a legitimate psychiatric disorder).
So nominalists and pragmatists are uncomfortable
when realists start talking abo u tf i x e dw o r l ds t r u c t u r e s
and natural kinds. There are, however, kinds - fastballs,
curve balls, etc. With the realists, the pragmatists and
nominalists recognize the value of understanding the
causal mechanisms that produce these kinds (e.g., Vase-
line helps you throw good spit balls), but individual
pitches can be grouped in a plurality of ways.
The constructionist position is the easiest to defend in
this example because baseball is a social construction,
and like other social constructions such as the U. S.
Government and currency, baseball is a real thing. So
what information do we gain from the constructionist
analysis? Rather than saying There are no balls and
strikes until “I” call them, it is more accurate to say that
social construction is a historical and community activ-
ity. Baseball proper did not exist in 1800 and a pretty
good story can be told about the social and economic
factors that helped shape the game we have today. A
similar narrative could be developed for psychiatry, for
example, there is a good story to be told about how
degeneration theory in the 19
th century and pharmaceu-
tical marketing practices in the 20
th century both shaped
the classification system. Social constructionists would
also point out that something like the introduction of
the designated hitter was not a deductive consequence
of the rules of the game. Its legitimacy has to be under-
stood with respect to the baseball community and its
chosen authorities. Something similar is true of the
scientific community and its designated authorities,
including the process by which the DSM and the ICD is
developed. The pragmatists consider this useful
information.
F i n a l l yw ec o m et ot h eS z a s i a n .I ti sac a t e g o r ym i s -
take to lump a political and ethical position such as I
refuse to play because the game is not fair with realism,
pragmatism, nominalism and constructionism. Anti-psy-
chiatry is better considered a behavioral option available
to a disillusioned realist. In terms of baseball, the claim
would be that in the rest of sports, things like field goals
and holes-in-one are objectively fixed, but there is so
much variation between umpires in terms of the strike
zone, that any rational person would see that the so-
called objectivity of the game is a myth. Other like-
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statistical evidence that the strike zone gets wider when
the count is full - which keeps the game exciting. It is
also economically convenient for the sport as a whole if
pitchers are allowed some leeway when being close to
throwing perfect games and batters allowed leeway
when being close to breaking hitting records. Field goals
and holes-in-one do not work like that, say the critics,
yet baseball wants its consumers to think it is like those
other sports. Perhaps the best argument against the
Szaszian view is to point out that if they studied football
and golf more closely, they might see that things are not
as always as objective over there as they assume. Base-
ball should not be evaluated with respect to an idealized
image of other sports just as psychiatry should not be
evaluated with respect to an idealized image of other
medical specialties.
Commentary: Mental Disorders, Like Diseases, Are
Constructs. So What?
Claire Pouncey, M.D., Ph.D.
Philadelphia, PA.
The literature on the philosophy of psychiatric nosol-
ogy often conflates questions of ontology - i.e., whether
mental disorders exist as abstract entities- with ques-
tions of epistemology - i.e., how we can know anything
about them if they do. To ask whether mental disorders
are (actual) diseases or (mere) constructs confuses these
two types of questions about mental disorders, as I will
use the first three umpire positions to illustrate. This
error is prevalent in academic discussions about psy-
chiatric nosology.
Ontologic commitments are basic metaphysical com-
mitments about what exists in the world. Most of us, by
virtue of the fact that we operate in our physical and
social worlds as we do, are committed to the existence
of intersubjectively appreciable mid-level objects, such
as plants, buildings, bodies of water, and other persons,
to name just a few. That is, we are realists about (and
realism is always local to a particular question) mid-
level objects, as evidenced by our behaviors.
It is easier to be skeptical (a.k.a. antirealist) about invi-
sible, microscopic, macroscopic, and abstract objects.
Most of us are ontologically committed to the existence
of oxygen, given what we know about basic physiology
and the chemistry of our natural environment, although
it is microscopic in its elemental form and undetectable
by the senses in its macroscopic form. Our commit-
ments to microscopic entities such as muons, macro-
scopic entities such as red giants, intangible phenomena
such as global warming, or second-order (categorical)
entities such as phyla may be much weaker, and more
prone to debate.
Mental disorders generate ontological skepticism on
several levels. First, they are abstract entities that cannot
be directly appreciated with the human senses, even
indirectly, as we might with macro- or microscopic
objects. Second, they are not clearly natural processes
whose detection is untarnished by human interpretation,
or the imposition of values. Third, it is unclear whether
mental disorders should be conceived as abstractions
that exist in the world apart from the individual persons
who experience them, and thus instantiate them.
Together, these reasons to doubt the ontic status of
mental disorders become quite persuasive.
Setting ontological antirealism aside, we can ask epis-
temological questions separately: if we assume that men-
tal disorders do exist as abstract entities, how do we go
about studying them, and on what basis can we possibly
gain genuine knowledge about them? Even if we collec-
tively agree that, for example, a particular person at a
given time were experiencing a major depressive epi-
sode, on what grounds can we know that ‘major depres-
sive disorder’ exists as an abstract entity? On what
grounds can we infer that the broader class ‘mood disor-
ders’,o r‘mental disorders’ as the most general class,
exist as further abstractions? Epistemic realists may be
realists about Hector’s depression, about the existence of
an abstract entity that is major depressive disorder, or
about the existence of mental disorders in the world
generally. They may not be realists about all three. Simi-
larly, epistemic antirealists may doubt one or more of
these commitments.
Umpire #1 is both an ontological realist and an episte-
mological realist about balls and strikes in baseball. Balls
and strikes are real things (events) that exist (happen) in
the world, and Umpire 1 has the means and ability to
detect them in accurate and unbiased ways: “There are
balls and there are strikes and I call them as they are.”
This tends to be the position attributed to psychiatry.
Psychiatry’s rhetoric, if not the actual commitments of
all practitioners, says both that mental disorders are
abstract entities that exist in the world and manifest in
individual persons, and that these processes can be
intersubjectively appreciated and elucidated as they truly
are. Let’s call this the Strong Realist position.
Such confidence is not exhibited by Umpire #2, who
shares the ontological realism of Umpire #1, but not the
epistemological realism. In tempering his epistemologi-
cal position to “Ic a l lt h e ma sIs e et h e m , ” Umpire #2
maintains that balls and strikes exist apart from his per-
ception of them, but softens his position to recognize
that he may not always perceive them as they exist in
the world. That is, Umpire #2 is ontologically committed
to the existence of balls and strikes, but does not
assume that he always has epistemic access to that
Phillips et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:3
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/3
Page 6 of 29reality. Let’s call this the Strong Realist/Weak Construc-
tivist position.
Umpire #3 is an ontological and an epistemological
antirealist about balls and strikes: no balls or strikes
exist in the world regardless of who thinks they might.
In calling them, the umpire constructs the truth. This is
not necessarily to say that all his calls are unfounded fic-
tions, but rather it is to say that although the umpire
describes his perceptions as accurately he can, there is
no ultimate, underlying reality to which those percep-
tions could be compared, even in the absence of episte-
mic limitations. Let’sc a l lt h i st h eS t r o n gC o n s t r u c t i v i s t
position.
Psychiatry’s strongest critics tend to make strong con-
structivist arguments: mental disorders do not exist, so
any diagnosis, treatment intervention, or research find-
i n gi se x e m p tf r o mu l t i m a t ec onfirmation or refutation.
In their strongest form, calling mental disorders ‘con-
structs’ is meant to communicate that they are mere fic-
tions, completely unfounded medical lore. However,
note that on the Strong Realist/Weak Constructivist
view this is not the case. Calling a mental disorder a
‘construct’ does not imply invention so much as it serves
as a reminder that our epistemic access to the reality of
things is always limited. On this view, every abstract
entity is a construct, and constructs can be legitimate
objects of scientific investigation. Often, there is broad
agreement about the nature of scientific constructs,
such as phyla, subatomic particles, or diseases, even if
the construct is construed as a working hypothesis, or a
category of disparate entities that does not lend itself to
simple definition or characterization. On this view, men-
tal disorders are like diseases: they are a heterogeneous
class of abstract entities that have uncertain ontic status
apart from the persons who instantiate them. In forma-
lizing its nosology, psychiatry is trying to call them as
we see them.
Commentary: Why Umpires Don’t Matter
Nassir Ghaemi, M.D.
Tufts University Department of Psychiatry.
Nietzsche said truth is a mobile army of metaphors. If
you get your metaphor wrong, you’ll miss the truth. I
think this is the case with the umpire metaphor that
seems to be the central concept underlying the thinking
of my interlocutor. I think it is simply wrong-headed. It
sets up psychiatry and science and knowledge as a
game, where the rules can be changed, and where there
m a yb en ot r u t h .I fy o ua r eap ostmodernist extremist,
this may make sense. But if you accept that there are
truths in the world (such as that if you take very high
doses of lithium, you will get toxicity), then it makes no
sense.
A mistaken metaphor has no response except to say
that it is mistaken.
Before offering a better metaphor, let me say that I
accept the realist position, that is, that diseases exist
independent of me and you that are expressed as psy-
chiatric symptoms like the chronic delusions of schizo-
phrenia, or the mood states of manic-depression. To
prove this fact, I suggest three approaches. One, sug-
gested by Paul McHugh, is to actually see people who
have these symptoms, the old kick the table test of rea-
lism. The second is to debate the merits of the positions
pro and con; I won’t do so here, but I think others have
done so in reasonably persuasive ways, such as Roth and
Kroll’s Reality of Mental Illness. The third is to apply
the pragmatic test, and see the consequences of one
position or the other. I accept the realist view in at least
some psychiatric diseases, but I would add that if one
does not, he or she should think of the consequences. I
don’t see how one can reject the reality of psychiatric
disease, and still practice psychiatry, especially with the
use of harmful drugs.
This metaphor brings out those stark choices, as well
as provides further rationale for the reality of at least
some psychiatric diseases based on how matters have
gone in other examples of similar problems in the his-
tory of science and medicine.
Here then is a better metaphor for understanding psy-
chiatric nosology, one that I heard from Kenneth Kend-
ler and which I am expanding here. In a presentation on
“epistemic iteration,” building on work in history of
science, Kendler described how we can understand any
scientific process as involving an approximation of rea-
lity through successive stages of knowledge. The main
alternative to this process is “random walk” where there
is no trend toward any goal in the process of scientific
research. Kendler points out that epistemic iteration
won’t work if there are no real psychiatric illnesses. If
these are all, completely and purely, nothing but social
constructions, figments of our cultural imaginations,
then there is no point to scientific research at all. (I
would add: to be honest doctors, we should stop thereby
killing patients with our toxic drugs - since all drugs are
toxic - stop taking their money to buy our large houses,
and retire.) The random walk model is a dead end for
any ethical practice of medicine, because if there is no
truth to the matter, then we should not claim to have
any special knowledge about the truth.
If there is a reality to any psychiatric illness, then epis-
temic iteration makes sense, and indeed it has been the
process by which much scientific knowledge has been
obtained in the past. Take temperature. A long process
evolved before we arrived at the expansion of mercury
as a good way to measure temperature. There was a
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tures. How we measured that reality varied over time,
and we gradually have evolved at a very good way of
measuring it. Temperature is not the same thing as mer-
cury expansion: our truth here is not some kind of mys-
tical absolute knowledge. But it is a true knowledge.
A similar rationale may apply to psychiatric diseases.
We may, over time, approximate what they are, with
our tools of knowledge, if we try to do so in a successive
and honest manner, seeking to really know the truth,
rather than presuming it does not exist.
The better metaphor, then, which captures epistemic
iteration versus random walk alternatives would be to
think of a surface, and a spot on that surface, which we
can label X, representing the true place we want our
disease definition (see figure). If we were God, we would
know that X is the right way to describe the disease. Let
A be our current knowledge. How do we get from A to
X. One way is to go from A to B, from B to C, from C
to D, in a zig zag pattern, as our research takes us in
different directions, but gradually and successively closer
to X. This is epistemic iteration.
The random walk pattern would involve the same
starting point A, and multiple movements to B, C, and
D, but with no endpoint, because no X would exist (see
figure). In this process, movement is random, there is
no reality pulling scientific research towards it, like grav-
ity pulling objects closer, and there is no end, and no
truth. If this is the nature of things, then our profession
has to admit to everyone everywhere that this is what
we are doing. We should then give up any claims to
specific knowledge and stop treating - and harming -
people.
The history of medicine and the history of science
gives many examples of both approaches. So the ques-
tion really is an ontological one: do mental illnesses
exist as realities in the external world, as biological dis-
eases independent of our social constructs and personal
beliefs? The umpire metaphor assumes, but does not
answer, that question. The epistemic iteration metaphor
shows how the answer to that question faces us with
two opposed choices about how we understand science
and psychiatry. If psychiatry is like the rest of medicine,
if there are some psychiatric diseases that are indepen-
dent biological realities just as there are some medical
diseases, then the epistemic iteration metaphor would
seem valid in some cases, and the umpire metaphor,
useless as it is, should be discarded. Figure 1.
Commentary: The Three Umpires of Metaphysics
Michael Cerullo, M.D.
University of Cincinatti Department of Psychiatry.
The debate about the nature of the external world has
been a central question of metaphysics since the first
pre-Socratic philosophers. Most working scientists and
philosophers today would be classified as modern rea-
lists who believe there is an independent objective exter-
nal reality. Within the realist camp there is further
debate about just how much we can know about abso-
lute reality. Immanuel Kant termed the underlying rea-
lity of the world “the thing in itself” (das Ding an sich)
and believed we could never truly know this ultimate
reality [34]. Opposed to the realists are the anti-realists
who hold that there is no independent objective reality
separate from our own subjective experience. Allen
Frances’ umpire analogy is a good way to frame the
major positions in this debate [2](Francis 2, 21-25).
Frances’ first umpire who believes there are balls and
strikes and calls them as they are is a modern realist.
Umpire two is a Kantian realist who believes there are
b a l l sa n ds t r i k e sb u tc a no n l yc a l lt h e ma ss h es e e s
them. Umpire three is an anti-realist who believes there
are no balls and strikes until he calls them.
These days it is hard to seriously defend an anti-realist
position in science. Neuroscientists contend that all
behavior, from depression to extroversion to a dislike of
tomatoes, is dependent and explainable by the workings
of the brain. On the other hand there is still a real
debate as to whether subatomic particles are the final
bedrock of reality or a mere appearance of a deeper rea-
lity (strings? more particles all the way down?). However
this latter Kantian uncertainty doesn’t seem to have
much relevance to the debate about the brain. After all,
it doesn’t seem to make any difference in our under-
standing of neurons if their atoms are ultimately made
of strings or point particles.
Outside of metaphysics there is another parallel to the
umpire analogy in epistemology. Within epistemology
there is a subfield interested in the taxonomy of illness.
The two major groups in this debate are the naturalists
and normativists [35,36]. Naturalists believe disease can
be defined objectively as a breakdown in normal biology.
The naturalist position corresponds to the first umpire.
Normativists believe our definitions of disease are sub-
jective and culturally driven and thus identify with the
third umpire. The second umpire seems to mix ele-
ments of both epistemological positions.
My own sympathies lie with modern realism when it
comes to behavior and a combination of normativist
and naturalist positions when defining disease. Although
there is physical explanation for all behavior (hence my
realist position), not everything in the universe is physi-
cal. Definitions of disease require value judgments, and
while each value judgment surely has a physical explana-
tion in the brain, nothing physical can decide which
judgment is correct. Even in areas of medicine outside
psychiatry there is often a strong normativist element in
how diseases are defined. Many diseases such as
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arbitrary cut off points in laboratory values. Deciding
these cut off points requires making hard decisions
about public health and considering the risk/benefit
ratio of any decision. There is clearly a strong normati-
vist element in theses definitions, yet clearly that does
not make them bad or incorrect descriptions. Many psy-
chiatric diseases also have a similar logic. While every-
one has some sad mood or anxiety there are obvious
extremes which are justifiably labeled as mood or anxi-
ety disorders. Once again there may be certain arbitrary
cut off points when deciding how much sadness or anxi-
ety is too much but that does not invalidate these defi-
nitions anymore so that it would the “physical” illness
listed above. This being said, there are also many dis-
eases that are much better defined from a more natural-
ist perspective. For example, in psychiatry schizophrenia
seems to be better defined from the naturalist perspec-
tive along with other physical diseases like Parkinson’s
disease or dementia. It seems easier to define these dis-
eases using the naturalist ideal of disease as a break-
down in the “typical” human biology.
The lesson in these debates is that psychiatrists (and
the public) should recognize that all definitions of dis-
ease have normativist and naturalist elements even in a
world described by a scientific realism. None of Frances’
umpires fits with my combined metaphysical and episte-
mological positions. Therefore I suggest a different
umpire, one who believes in an objective physical world
that we can access to determine exactly what are balls
and strikes. Yet it is the umpire and players who first
must choose the rules of the game, some of which may
always seem arbitrary but the majority of which are con-
strained by the physics of balls and bats and the seman-
tic and historical notions of games and baseball.
Commentary
Jerome C. Wakefield, Ph.D., D.S.W.
Silver School of Social Work and Department of Psy-
chiatry, New York University.
Regarding the Umpires: First, to avoid confusion, one
has to distinguish the role of Umpire calls within the
rules of baseball from the call as an attempt to state
what happened. The Umpire calls them as he/she sees
them, with the goal of getting it right - and understands
that the way it looks can be misleading. But, whether
correct or incorrect, the Umpire’sc a l l“stands” despite
any later evidence that emerges to the contrary, and to
that extent the call constitutes/constructs the game’s
reality. Diagnosis, too, has dual aspects - a game in
Epistemic Iteration 
     C      F    H   I   X
A                     E    G     
   B       
      D  
 
Random Walk            
             J  
      
     C   D     F     I    
A                                
   B       
       E     G H    
Figure 1 Epistemic Iteration Versus Random Walk.
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a n dah y p o t h e s i sa b o u tw h a ti sg o i n go ni nt h ep a t i e n t .
I focus on the hypothesis-testing aspects of both Umpire
calls and the DSM.
In attempting to make a call that reflects the truth,
Umpires 1 and 3 embrace intellectual doctrines designed
to deal with their epistemic anxieties - Umpire 1 can’t
stand uncertainty, and Umpire 3 can’ts t a n dt h ea r r o -
gance that comes from Umpire 1’s certainty. Ironically,
Umpire 1 and Umpire 3 fall into the same fallacy, that
of collapsing ontology and epistemology into one.
Umpire 1 naively sees his/her judgment as being a direct
impression of reality without epistemic mediation, thus
epistemological uncertainty is avoided. Umpire 3 sees
his/her judgment as creating or constituting “reality”
from his/her perspective, so again epistemological
uncertainty is avoided. On the other hand, Umpire 2,
while closest to the correct approach, describes his/her
reality and his/her perception in a rather disconnected
way.
So, I vote for Umpire 1.5 (humble realism): There are
balls and there are strikes (plus some ontologically fuzzy
cases), and based on how I see them and any other
available evidence, I call them as I believe they are, and
because the evidence in these cases is usually a pretty
good indicator of reality, calling them as I see them
usually equals calling them as they are. But, I can be
wrong! The truth does not necessarily correspond to my
call, and fresh evidence can always be brought to bear
to help get closer to the truth.
Common sense offers the best guide here. Recently,
Tigers’ pitcher Armando Galarraga was one pitch away
from achieving baseball immortality with a perfect
game, an extremely rare event. In a close call at first
base, Umpire Jim Joyce called the runner safe, destroy-
ing Galarraga’s chance. But, as everyone saw from the
instant reply, in fact the runner, Jason Donald, was out.
Jim Joyce said to the press; “I just cost that kid a perfect
game... I thought (Donald) beat the throw. I was con-
vinced he beat the throw, until I saw the replay... It was
the biggest call of my career and I kicked the (expletive)
out of it.” He then went to Galarraga and explained
what he saw, and made it clear that he was wrong
("Imperfect” Umpire Apologizes by Steve Adubato, Ph.
D., Star-Ledger). Fortunately for the lessons we and our
kids take away from baseball, Joyce was not Umpire 1
or 2 or 3, but humble realist Umpire 1.5 who under-
stood the possibility of error inherent in the attempt for
mind to represent reality.
As to the other part of the question, the dichotomy
between constructivism and realism is a false one. Our
diagnostic categories are constructs (as are all concepts)
intended in the long run to refer to underlying diseases/
disorders. Current DSM diagnoses are constructs that
are starting points for a recursive process aimed at get-
ting at disorders. We somewhat misleadingly refer to
them now as “disorders,” although frequently we
acknowledge that one of these categories likely encom-
passes many disorders. Close attention to the way revise
our views and the grounds on which our judgments are
made suggests that the individuation of disorders ulti-
mately depends on the individuation of dysfunctions
(see the answer to question 6).
Commentary
Joseph Pierre, M.D.
UCLA Department of Psychiatry.
Consider the brief history of Pluto as a planet, as told
in the recently published book, H o wIK i l l e dP l u t oa n d
Why It Had It Coming [37]. A few thousand years ago,
during the era of Greek geocentrism, the Earth was con-
sidered to be the center of the universe, while the sun
and moon were regarded as two of the seven planets
that orbited around it. Later in the 16
th century, as
Copernicus’ mathematical models of heliocentrism were
embraced, the Earth and the sun traded categories at
the expense of the moon. The subsequent discoveries of
Uranus in 1781, Neptune in 1846, and Pluto in 1930
resulted in the total of nine planets that most of us
learned about in elementary school. However, in 2006,
Pluto was officially downgraded from classification as a
planet, in part because of the discovery in 2005 of a lar-
ger mass of rock and ice called “Xena” orbiting not that
far away. Now our children will be taught that there are
only eight planets, and will perhaps eventually learn that
there are also heavenly bodies called “dwarf planets,”
among them Pluto and Eris (the new, official name for
“Xena”).
To anyone that really relies on taxonomy in their daily
work, it inevitably becomes apparent that such efforts at
classification never seem to do a perfect job of “carving
nature at its joints.” This is especially true with scientifi-
cally-based taxonomies - they change based on the evo-
lution of underlying definitions; new categories and sub-
categories emerge while previous entities are re-categor-
ized in order to accommodate new data; and challenges
to classification at border-zones linger on. Although this
kind of change sometimes causes the general public to
regard science with skepticism, it is this very adaptability
in the face of new data that is the strength of science
and the feature that most distinguishes it from dogma.
The belief that this dynamic process is both acceptable
and necessary for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM) would seem to place myself
in the category of Allen Frances’“ Umpire #2,” where I
suspect the vast majority of clinicians reside. Still, since
I have just suggested that reality often defies simple
classification, allow me to state my position more
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that they are brain-mediated diseases (leaving aside for
the moment the challenge of defining “disease”)w i t h
genetic, biologic, and environmental etiologies and influ-
ences. The disorders (not diseases) cataloged in the
DSM represent our best attempts at achieving consensus
definitions of these conditions, seriously limited as we
are by diagnosis that is based almost exclusively on
describing manifest symptoms. Because of this limita-
tion, it is unavoidable that psychiatric diagnosis is overly
simplistic, just as many medical diagnoses would still be
if not for technology-driven discoveries about pathophy-
siology. As such, DSM diagnoses are constructs, and
DSM-IV’s chief utility is as a “good enough rough guide
for clinical work [38].”
As an imperfect work in progress, the DSM-IV con-
tains diagnostic constructs of variable validity. In the
tradition of Umpire #1, I believe that many of the disor-
ders in DSM do a good job of describing the essential
symptomatic features of what are probably “real dis-
eases” (e.g. obsessive-compulsive disorder). However, I
can also acknowledge the concerns of Umpire #3,
including that some DSM disorders may tread danger-
ously close to pathological labeling of socially unaccep-
table behaviors (e.g. paraphilias) [39], while others might
be better understood as “culture-bound syndromes” (e.g.
anorexia) [40].
Commentary
Gary Greenberg, Ph.D.
New London, CT.
“There are no balls or strikes until I call them” is not
the postmodern fantasia that it sounds, nor is it a
throwback to the idealism thatS a m u e lJ o h n s o nr e f u t e d
so thoroughly by kicking Bishop Berkeley in the knee.
Or, to put it another way, it is neither the death knell of
psychiatry nor a straw man for psychiatrists to use to
refute their critics.
What it is, really, is just plain common sense. To
question diagnosis is not to question the existence of
suffering, or of the mind that gives us the experience of
suffering, or of the value of sorting it into category. It is
merely to point out that before we can do that sorting,
we have to posit those categories. Where do they come
from? Are there really diseases in nature?
Consider this question. What is the difference, from
nature’s point of view, between the snapping of a branch
of an old oak tree and the snapping of a femur of an old
man? We rightly recoil from the suggestion that there is
no difference, and yet to assume that there is in nature
a difference is to assume that nature cares about us
enough to provide us with categories of broken hips.
There is ample evidence, most stunningly Darwinian
theory, that this is not true. Nature is indifferent. Unlike
Major League Baseball, nature doesn’t provide the rules
by which the world can be divided into balls and strikes.
If there is a difference between the hip and the
branch, it is surely to be found in the difference between
the man and the tree, which is that the man is capable
of caring about his femur, as are the people that love
him. The only reason to distinguish one break from the
other is to create a category–intracapsular transcervical
fracture, Stage II,l e t ’s say. Naming the suffering, we
bring it into the human realm. (It is not a coincidence
that the authors of Genesis tell us that the first task
given to Adam and Eve in Eden was to name the crea-
tures of the earth; naming is how we put our stamp on
the world.) By inventing categories like this one, we give
ourselves a way to get hold of it, which in medicine
means among other things a way to talk to other profes-
sionals about it, a way to determine treatment options,
and a way to provide a prognosis to the patient and
family. What we don’td oi st od i s c o v e rt h a tn a t u r e
intends hips to break in certain ways, that there exist in
nature intracapsular transcervical fractures and trochan-
teric fractures, any more than nature provides a branch
with different ways to snap off a tree.
This much is uncontroversial, largely because whether
you buy the argument or not, you are still going to treat
the problem more or less the same way. The difference
b e t w e e nf r a c t u r ea sam a nm a d ea n dan a t u r a lc a t e g o r y
is trivial, unless you’re in a philosophical argument. But
when it comes to psychiatry, something changes. To call
a snapped femur an illness is to make only the broadest
assumptions about human nature–that it is in our nat-
ure to walk and to be out of pain. To call fear general-
ized anxiety disorder or sadness accompanied by
anhedonia, disturbances in sleep and appetite, and fati-
gue depression requires us to make much tighter, and
more decisive, assumptions about who we are, about
how we are supposed to feel, about what life is for. How
much anxiety is a creature cognizant of its inevitable
death supposed to feel? How sad should we be about
the human condition? How do you know that?
To create these categories is to take a position on the
most basic, and unanswerable, questions we face: what
is the good life, and what makes it good? It’st h ee p i -
tome of hubris to claim that you have determined scien-
tifically how to answer those questions, and yet to insist
that you have found mental illnesses in nature is to do
exactly that. But that’s not to say that you can’t deter-
mine scientifically patterns of psychic suffering as they
are discerned by people who s p e n dal o to ft i m eo b s e r -
ving and interacting with sufferers. The people who
detect and name those patterns cannot help but orga-
nize what they observe according to their lived experi-
ence. The categories they invent then allow them to call
those diseases into being. They don’tm a k et h e
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them under microscopes, or under rocks for that matter.
That’s what it means to say that the diseases don’te x i s t
until the doctors say they do. Which doesn’t mean the
diseases don’t exist at all, just that they are human crea-
tions, and, at their best, fashioned out of love.
If psychiatry were to officially recognize this funda-
mental uncertainty, then it would become a much more
honest profession–and, to my way of thinking, a more
noble one. For it would not be able to lose sight of the
basic mystery of who we are and how we are supposed
to live.
Commentary
Harold A Pincus, M.D.
Columbia University Department of Psychiatry.
T h ef o u r t hu m p i r eh a sav e r yp r a g m a t i cp e r s p e c t i v e
and understands that a classification of diagnostic cate-
gories is used for many different purposes by many dif-
ferent groups and individuals. Umpire 4 also
understands that these various “user groups” approach
their tasks with varying empirical, philosophical and his-
torical backgrounds and, and with this proliferation of
users and backgrounds, there needs to be a balance
between (to mix metaphors) letting “a thousand flowers
bloom” - creating a Tower of Babel with little ability to
effectively communicate among these groups - and a
single approach that cannot be tailored to particular
needs. From this perspective, there is a recognition that
the world has changed and the management of informa-
tion has become the pre-eminent task of a classification
system, overshadowing (but also enhancing), the clinical,
research and educational goals of a classification. As
such, the ICD/DSM should serve a critical translation
function to anchor communications among multiple
user groups that apply psychiatric classification in their
day to day functions.
This information management goal intersects with
multiple user groups in terms of:
-health policy
-clinical decision making
-quality measurement
-epidemiology
-educational certification/accreditation
-multiple areas of research from genetics to psycho-
pharmacology to cognitive science, etc.
The way this would work is that the ICD/DSM classi-
fication would remain relatively stable, serving as a kind
of “Rosetta Stone” to facilitate communication among
the various user groups. Each individual user “tribe” (or
individual scientist) would be free to identify various
alternative classifications. However, all journals or other
public reporting mechanisms would require that any
clinical population also be described in the ICD/DSM
classification in addition to whatever tribal criteria for
the “Syndrome XYZ”, 70% met ICD/DSM criteria for
GAD, 40% OCD, and 30% Anxiety Disorder, NOS).
Changes in future (descriptive) classifications should be
infrequent and guided by a highly conservative process
that would only incorporate changes with strong evi-
dence that they:
1. Enhance overall communication among the
“tribes”
2. Enhance clinical decision-making
3. Enhance patient outcomes
However, ICD/DSM would have a section describing
the relationships among the various tribal concepts that
could be updated on a more frequent basis.
Note that this approach gives up the ideal (or even a
focus) on validity, per se. Maintaining effective commu-
nication (most notably, effective use, reliability and
understandability) and clinical utility [41] (either the
more limited improvement of clinical and organizational
decision-making processes or the ideal of outcomes
improvement) become the principal goals of the classifi-
cation. In other words, while a psychiatric classification
must be useful for a variety of purposes, it cannot be
expected to be simultaneously at the forefront of, for
example, neurobiology and genetics, psychoanalysis, and
the education of mental health counselors, primary care
providers and psychologists.
However, multiple groups can continue their work on
epistemic iteration using genetic approaches and others
can develop ways to better measure quality or costs of
care and yet others can study dimensional ratings of
personality. However, each tribal group would need to
be able to communicate across the commons using the
“Rosetta Stone”. Thus, we would not be wobbling
toward the asymptote of true validity, but, instead, be
very slowly, but continually, rising toward the goal of
better outcomes for patients.
Commentary
Thomas Szasz, M.D.
SUNY Upstate Medical University.
I thank Dr. James Phillips for inviting me to comment
on this debate. I am pleased but hesitant to accept, lest
by engaging in a discussion of the DSM (the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
u a lo fM e n t a lD i s o r d e r s ) I legitimize the conceptual
validity of “mental disorders” as medical diseases, and of
psychiatry as a medical specialty.
Psychiatrists and others who engage in this and simi-
lar discussions accept psychiatry as a science and
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(APA) as a medical-scientific organization, and the DSM
as a list of “disorders,” a weasel word for “diagnoses”
and “diseases,” which are different phenomena, not
merely different words for the same phenomenon.
In law, the APA is a legitimating organization and the
DSM a legitimating document. In practice, it is the APA
and the DSM that provide medical, legal and ethical jus-
tification for physicians to diagnose and treat, judges to
incarcerate and excuse, insurance companies to pay, and
a myriad other social exchanges to be transacted. Impli-
citly, if not explicitly, the debaters’s task is to improve
the “accuracy” of the DSM as a “diagnostic instrument”
and increase its power as a document of legitimation.
Long ago, having become convinced of the fictitious
character of mental disorders, the immorality of psychia-
tric coercions and excuses, and the frequent injurious-
ness of psychiatric treatments, I set myself a very
different task: namely, to delegitimize the legitimating
authorities and agencies and their vast powers, enforced
by psychiatrists and other mental health professionals,
mental health laws, mental health courts, and mental
health sentences.
In Psychiatry: The Science of Lies, I cite the warning of
John Selden, the celebrated seventeenth-century English
jurist and scholar: “The reason of a thing is not to be
inquired after, till you are sure the thing itself be so. We
commonly are at, what’s the reason for it? before we are
sure of the thing.” In psychiatry it is usually impossible
to be sure of “’what a thing itself really is,” because “the
thing itself” is prejudged by social convention couched
in ordinary language and then translated into pseudo-
medical jargon.
Seventy-five years ago, in my teens, I suspected that
mental illness was a bogus entity and kept my mouth
shut. Twenty-five years later, more secure in my iden-
tity, I said so in print. Fifty years later, in the tenth dec-
ade of my life, I am pleased to read Dr. Allen Frances
candidly acknowledging: “Alas, I have read dozens of
definitions of mental disorder (and helped to write one)
and I can’t say that any have the slightest value what-
ever. Historically, conditions have become mental disor-
ders by accretion and practical necessity, not because
they met some independent set of operationalized defi-
nitional criteria. Indeed, the concept of mental disorder
is so amorphous, protean, and heterogeneous that it
inherently defies definition. This is a hole at the center
of psychiatric classification.” This is as good as saying,
“Mental illness, there ain’t no such thing,” and still
remain loyal to one’s profession.
The fallacy intrinsic to the concept of mental illness -
call it mistake, mendacity, metaphor, myth, oxymoron,
or what you will - constitutes a vastly larger “problem”
than the phrase “a hole at the center of psychiatric
classification” suggests. The “hole” - “mental illness” as
medical problem - affects medicine, law, education, eco-
nomics, politics, psychiatry, the mental health profes-
sions, everyday language - indeed the very fabric of
contemporary Western, especially American, society.
The concept of “psychiatric diagnosis,” enshrined in the
DSM and treated by the discussants as a “problem,” is
challenging because it is also a solution, albeit a false
one.
Medicalization, epitomized by psychiatry, is the foun-
dation stone of our modern, secular-statist ideology,
manifested by the Therapeutic State. The DSM, though
patently absurd, has become an utterly indispensable
legal-social tool.
Ideologies - supported by common consent, church,
state, and tradition - are social facts/"truths.” As such,
they are virtually impervious to criticism and possess
very long lives. The DSM is here to stay and so is the
intellectual and moral morass in which psychiatry has
entwined itself and the modern mind.
Commentary: On Inviting the Gorilla to the
Epistemological Party
Elliott Martin, M.D.
Yale University Department of Psychiatry.
What makes the epistemological umpire analogy so
enticing is its capacity for adaptation, the fact that the
strike zone must be different for every batter. If I call
‘em as I see ‘em, then of course what is a ball thrown to
one batter may be a strike thrown to another. As
applied to the broadly descriptive nosology of DSM IV
there is hardly an argument to be made against this. But
let’s add a missing piece to the scenario. Let’sc a s tt h e
eight hundred pound gorilla in the analogy, the insurers,
as ‘the owner’. More specifically, let’s call the beast ‘the
hometown owner’. And then let’s say the umpire’s salary
is paid by the owner.
With the game yet played on rural fields, before the
advent of electronic pitch-tracking devices, before the
price of every pitch was calculated, before the global
media contracts, the strike zone was a sacred space, the
tiny, arbitrary, marked off piece of ether from which
intimacy the entire game was decided. Before the ‘own-
ers’ blew the entire field up to stadium-size the game
was about conceptualization and process; before psy-
chiatry was snatched up by the insurers the pathologies
were sought in subjectivity over objectivity. Artfulness
existed alongside science. What, after all, did psychia-
trists care for nosology before the rise of private insur-
ance over the past several decades? Disordered thinking,
as opposed to ordered thinking, was just that. Slapping
an a m eo ni td i dl i t t l et oc h a n g et h ef a c t .O n em a n ’s
depression is another man’s ‘blues’, and what does the
patient care for the label?
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true, but the only conversations I have had in which I
have coughed up the full DSM criteria have been those
over the telephone, most often in the emergency room,
with insurance reviewers ‘objectively’ determining, from
up to thousands of miles away, whether a particular
patient warrants two days or three days in which to be
c u r e d .A n da tt h a t ,f o rt h eb e n e f i ta n ds a f e t yo fm y
p a t i e n t s ,m ys t r i k ez o n ew i d e n st r e m e n d o u s l ya f t e rf i v e
minutes, and my diagnoses tend to reduce to the very
non-DSM, if at times heavily punctuated, ‘imminently
suicidal!’ or ‘imminently homicidal!’.T h ea r g u m e n t s
tend to end there, and it is apparent that what is miss-
ing in the epistemological umpire analogy is the hard
baseball rule against arguing balls and strikes.
As a former academic, however, I simply have to
believe that there is an inherent value in the pursuit of
knowledge for knowledge’s sake, that all sciences, veiled
or not, are interwoven, regardless of the current para-
digms, and the loss of even one is somehow crippling to
the others. But ‘the owners’, despite the fact that they
stand oblivious, willfully or not, to the devastation they
create, can no longer be ignored in these arguments.
Whatever the historical mechanisms, the pursuit of
knowledge has come up hard against the pursuit of
profit in these last few decades. I contend that the pro-
cess of classification is the process that, if not created
by, than at least has been manipulated ever since by the
owners. As students of the human mind, arbitrary classi-
fication of disorders of the mind does not inform us; it
informs the gorilla. Describing ‘normalcy’ and ‘variants
thereof’ only serve to destroy further an already hobbled
subjectivity. Nosology destroys narrative, and where for-
merly our patients were more appropriately likened to
novels, they are now become, for the ease of illiterate
overlords, more like newspapers.
As the noted Assyriologist, Jean Bottero, put it in
defense of his own limited field, “Y e s ,t h eu n i v e r s i t yo f
sciences is useless; for profit, yes, philosophy is useless,
anthropology is useless, archaeology, philology, and his-
tory are useless, oriental studies and Assyriology are
useless, entirely useless. That is why we hold them in
such high esteem!” [[42], p. 25] Psychiatry finds itself in
a unique position among the ‘useless’ sciences. Like the
umpire offered a bribe by the owner, if the field chooses
utterly to subserve profit it likely stands to gain tremen-
dously. If the field chooses to uphold an ideal of human-
ism in the face of gorilla-ism then we will likely be faced
with the same fate as philosophy, anthropology, archae-
ology, philology, and history. In which case let us all call
‘em as we see ‘em, keep the paperwork tidy, and at the
very least be ever mindful of the watchful gaze of the
gorilla.
Allen Frances responds: There Is A Time And Place For
Every Umpire
None of the five umpires is completely right all of the
time. And none is totally wrong all of the time. Each
has a season and appropriate time at the plate.
Forty years ago, Umpires 1, 3, and 5 were in competi-
tive ascendance. The nascent school of biological psy-
chiatry was a confident Umpire 1- convinced that
mental disorders would soon yield their secrets and be
as fully understood as physical illnesses. In fact, there
was a heated controversy whether the new diagnostic
manual (DSM III) then being prepared was a catalog of
‘disorders’ or of their much preferred term ‘diseases’.
In sharp contrast, the competing models that domi-
nated psychiatry forty years ago were very much like the
skeptical Umpires 3 and 5- in their different ways, all
were nihilistic about the value or reality of psychiatric
diagnosis. Psychoanalysis dealt with highly inferential
concepts impossible to reduce to reliable diagnosis.
Family, group, and community psychiatry went so far as
to deny that the individual patient was a proper or very
relevant unit for diagnostic assessment, preferring mod-
els that diagnosed the system at larger aggregates of
interpersonal affiliation. When Szasz, then as now,
decried the ‘myth of mental illness’,t h e r ew a sl i t t l e
coherent opposition outside the group of the smugly
confident pioneers of biological psychiatry (who soon
would be hoisted by their own petard).
The years have not been kind to umpires 1, 3, and 5.
Each still stakes some small claim to attention, but
umpire 2 now clearly rules and welcomes the collabora-
tion of his close cousin, the ever practical umpire 4.
Why the revolution in epistemological sentiment? Bio-
logical psychiatry helped spark a wondrous neuroscience
revolution that is perhaps the most thrilling focus of
twenty first century biological science. But the findings
have revealed a remarkably complex brain unwilling to
yield any simple answers. There is thus far almost no
translation from the glory of basic science discovery to
the hard slog of understanding the etiology and patho-
genesis of the ‘mental disorders’. These no longer seem
at all reducible to simple diseases, but rather are better
understood as no more than currently convenient con-
structs or heuristics that allow us to communicate with
one another as we conduct our clinical, research, educa-
tional, forensic, and administrative work.
Most hard core biological psychiatrists have lost heart
in the naςve faith of umpire 1 that he can define simple
models of illness. Those who were hunting (and report-
ing) the gene or genes for schizophrenia, bipolar, and
other disorders have been forced repeatedly to retract
and eat humble pie. Initial findings never achieved repli-
cation for what became the obvious reason that there is
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is better understood as just a construct (albeit it a very
useful one) with hundreds of different ‘causes’.
Meanwhile the diagnostic nihilism of Umpires 3 and 5
also became less relevant when DSM III proved that
psychiatric diagnosis could be a reliable and useful tool
of communication.
Umpire 2 now rules. Mental disorders are no more
and no less than constructs. And Umpire 4 is quick to
point out that they are very useful constructs. The cur-
rent dominance of Umpires 2 and 4 is temporary, and
certainly not complete. In some very gradual and piece-
meal way, the future holds hope for an increased role
for Umpire 1. As we slowly discover the biology of men-
tal disorders, small subunits will cohere around a com-
mon pathogenesis and declare themselves as a disease.
This is beginning to happen for the dementias of the
Alzheimer’s type. But it will always be necessary to
retain the corrective voices of the skeptical Umpires 3
a n d5 -t or e m i n du sj u s th o wl i t t l ew ek n o wa n dh o w
feeble are our tools for knowing.
Reply to Drs Zachar and Lobello
Thank you for your contribution which I received after
writing my own. You have stated my position with
much greater clarity and erudition than I could muster.
Reply to Dr Pouncey
Thank you for your clarification of the Umpire meta-
phor. Your analysis nicely demonstrates the similarities
and the differences in the positions of Umpires 1 and 2-
both accept the possibility of an independent reality, but
differ sharply in there estimation of our current ability
to apprehend it.
Reply to Dr Ghaemi
Dr Ghaemi sets up a false and totally unnecessary
dichotomy between his true believer version of realism
and what he calls “taking a random walk”. It is possible,
indeed necessary, to take a very modest position regard-
ing the current state of certitude of psychiatric knowl-
edge on the causes of psychopathology without
assuming that we know nothing or are walking totally
blind or that our constructs have no current heuristic
value. Umpire 2’s honest admission that he can do no
better than call them as he sees them does not deny the
possibility of real strikes and real balls- it just states the
very constrained limits of our apprehension. I have no
problem at all with the metaphor of epistemic iteration-
it is obviously the route of all science. But let’sr e a l i z e
how early in the path we are and how uncertain is its
best direction.
Reply to Dr Cerullo
How comforting to be a first umpire. I admire the
magisterial confidence of Dr Cerullo’s statement, “Most
working scientists and philosophers would be classified
as modern realists who believe there is an independent
objective external reality”. I wish I could feel so firmly
planted in a “real” world and possess such naςve faith in
mankind’s capacity to apprehend its contours. Alas, as I
read it, the enormous expansion of human knowledge
during the last hundred years is enough to make umpire
1’s head spin with confusion. The more we learn, the
more we discover just how much we don’t (and perhaps
can’t) know. Einstein gave us a four dimensional world
that even physicists have trouble visualizing. Then the
string theorists made it exponentially more complicated
by expanding the dimensions into double figures and
introducing conceptions of reality that may or may not
ever be testable. The quantum theorists describe a
“spooky” (Einstein’s term) and inherently uncertain
world that lends itself to extremely accurate large n pre-
diction, but totally defies our intuitive understanding of
the specific mechanics. It also turns out that we are
pathetically limited in our sensory capacities, even when
they are extended with our most powerful sensing
instruments. Evolution allows us to detect only 4% of
our universe, the rest of energy and matter being “dark”
to us. Indeed, there may be a vast multiplicity of multi-
verses out there and we may never know them. So I
don’t see human beings as having great status as judges
of reality- we are like mice describing the proverbial ele-
phant- having available only fallible and very temporary
constructs.
To get back to our umpires, the connections between
brain functioning and psychiatric problems are definitely
real, but they are so complex and heterogeneous as to
defy any simple “realist” faith that we are close to seeing
them straight on, much less solving them.
Response to Dr Wakefield
Drs Wakefield and Pouncey have made many of the
same important points. Dr Wakefield’s “humble realism”
(associated with an honest and flexible willingness to
admit fallibility and the possibility of error) works for a
great baseball umpire and is not a bad model for a psy-
chiatric diagnostician. The difference between umpire 2
and umpire 1.5 depends on how close you think our
field is to understanding the reality of psychopathology.
I am even more humble than Dr Wakefield and will
stick with umpire 2.
Reply to Dr Pierre
I agree.
Reply to Dr Greenberg
In defending Umpire 3, Dr Greenberg assumes a
grandly, neutral view of man’s place in the world and
makes clear how limited are our abilities in naming and
classifying its manifestations. Greenberg rightly suggests
that the distinction between a broken branch and a bro-
ken femur may be extremely meaningful to the patient
and his doctor, but is really trivial in the grand scheme
of an indifferent nature. He might equally have pointed
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ad i s e a s e -i ti sj u s ta no p p o r t u n i t yf o rag o o df e e d .D i s -
eases, according to Greenberg’s argument, are no more
than human constructs made up de novo by us as inher-
ently self interested third umpires.
From Greenberg’s lofty perch, mankind’s attempts to
label do seem pathetically self referential and solipsistic,
extremely limited in their apprehension of reality (even
assuming that there is a graspable reality ready to be
apprehended). But it seems to me that his level of philo-
sophic detachment works only in the exalted theoretical
realms, and contrary (to his statement) fails badly to do
justice to the needs and opportunities of our everyday,
“common sense” world.
Greenberg and I do agree completely on several
points: 1) if mother nature had the gift of speaking our
language and the motivation to do so, she would prob-
ably indicate she couldn’t care less about our names and
that she doesn’t feel particularly well described by them;
2) our categories are no more than tentative approxima-
tions and are subject to distortion by personal whims,
cultural values local to time and place, ignorance, and
the profit motive; and, 3) psychiatry’s names should be
used with special caution because they lack strong exter-
nal validators, carry great social valence, and describe
very fuzzy territorial boundaries.
Where my umpire 2 position differs from Greenberg’s
umpire 3 is in our relative estimations of how closely
our names and constructs can ever come to approximat-
ing an underlying reality. My umpire 2 position is skep-
tical about umpire 1’s current ability “to call them as
they are” and advises modesty in the face of the brain’s
seemingly inexhaustible complexity. But I remain hope-
ful that there is a reality and that, at least at the human
level, it will eventually become more or less knowable.
We may never fully figure out the origin and fate of the
universe or the loopy weirdness of the quantum world.
But the odds are that decades (or centuries) of scientific
advance will gradually elucidate the hundreds (or thou-
sands) of different pathways responsible for what we
now crudely call “schizophrenia”.
Greenberg is more skeptical than I about the progress
of science and is, at heart, a platonic idealist who finds
life cheapened by excessive brain materialism. He sees
psychiatric disorders as no more than human constructs
- metaphors, some of which are useful, some harmful.
His umpire 3 does not does not believe the glory and
pain of human existence can or should be completely
reduced to the level of chemical reactions or neuronal
misconnections. This is a fair view for poets and philo-
sophers (and Greenberg is both), but I see a ghost in his
machine and dispute that allowing it in makes “common
sense”.
Reply to Dr Pincus
Thank you for inventing the fourth umpire. Dr Pincus is
the most practical of men and he has created a handy
metaphor for describing the ultimate goal of any DSM-
to be useful to its users. There is only one problem with
the fourth umpire’s position- but it is a big one. There
is no external check on his discretion, no scientific or
value system that guides what is useful. Everything
depends on the skill and goodwill of the umpire. In the
wrong hands pragmatism can have dreadful conse-
quences- commissars who treat political dissent as men-
tal illness or judges who psychiatrically commit run of
the mill rapists to keep them off the streets. But to
ignore the practical consequences of psychiatric deci-
sions leads to its own set of abuses- most recently diag-
nostic inflation and excessive treatment.
Reply to Dr Szasz
I have enormous respect for intellectual reach and depth
of Dr Szasz’ critique of psychiatric diagnosis and for the
moral power of his lifelong efforts to prevent its misuse.
He skillfully undercut the pretentions of the Umpire I
position at a time when its biological proponents were at
their triumphalist peak, loudly trumpeting that they were
close to finding the gene for schizophrenia and to eluci-
dating its brain lesions. He anticipated and exposed the
naivete of these overly ambitious and misleading claims.
He has fought the good fight to protect the rights, dig-
nity, and personal responsibility of those deemed to be
“mentally ill”. My argument with Dr Szasz is that he goes
too far and draws bright lines where there are shades of
gray. Surely, he is right that schizophrenia is no “disease”,
but that does not mean it is a “myth”. Surely, he is right
that psychiatric diagnosis can be misused and misunder-
stood, but that doesn’t mean it is useless or can be dis-
pensed with. Dr Szasz is correct in defining the many of
problems with psychiatric diagnosis, but doesn’th a v e
a l t e r n a t i v es o l u t i o n s .T h e r ei sab a b yi nt h e r ew i t ht h e
bath water he is so eager to discard.
Reply to Dr Martin
I agree that we can’ta l w a y sa s s u m et h eU m p i r e sa r e
acting only from the purist and most disinterested of
motives. Games can be fixed for financial gain and psy-
chiatry operates in a real world of large drug company,
insurance, and publishing profits. My experience has
been that the actual framers of DSM IV and of DSM 5
have not been shills for industry- but that heavy drug
marketing has led to much over-diagnosis using DSM
IV and that the risks are greatly heightened because of
the new diagnoses being suggested for DSM 5. Dr Mar-
tin’s comment makes clear that we must be aware the
diagnosis of a given patient can be distorted by real
world economic factors and must be ever vigilant to
protect the integrity of the process.
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It has been difficult to reach agreement on a defini-
tion of mental disorder. Could you comment on this
problem, or offer what you think is an adequate defi-
nition of the concept, mental disorder?
Introduction
On the face of it this is a strange question. As treating
clinicians we surely should be able to offer a definition
of what it is we treat. As researchers surely we should
be able to define the object of our research. And finally
as philosophers writing about mental illness, surely we
should be able to provide a definition of the object of
our investigation. So why is it so difficult to accomplish
these tasks? Allen Frances has puzzled over this ques-
tion, and as he indicates below, it leads him into
Humpty Dumpty’s world of “shifting, ambiguous, and
idiosyncratic word usages.”
Failures to accomplish a consensually accepted defini-
tion lead in two directions: give up or keep trying. The
first approach is represented by Warren Kinghorn, who
argues in his commentary that we won’t achieve the
desired definition and don’tn e e di ta n y w a y-a n ym o r e
than other specialists do for their work - and thus
should abandon the effort to try yet again to get it right
in DSM-5.
The opposite approach is represented in different
ways: by Jerome Wakefield, on the one hand, and Stein
and colleagues, on the other. In his contribution to this
article Wakefield presents the evolution-based harmful
dysfunction definition of mental illness for which he is
justly well-known. In this contribution he argues that
the varied positions of figures like Allen Frances and
Kenneth Kendler depend implicitly on the HD under-
standing and definition of mental disorder.
Stein and colleagues (not represented in this article)
[43] take another approach in trying to improve the
DSM-IV definition by operationalizing it, and then
going to work on the operationalized definition. They
tweak some of the DSM-IV (definitional) criteria as well
as adding further criteria, e.g., acknowledging the nor-
mative, value-laden aspect of many diagnoses. In their
effort to improve the DSM-IV definition, they address
many of the complaints lodged against DSM-IV (co-
morbidity, poor separation between diagnoses, poor
separation from normality, etc.) In trying to be compre-
hensive, they include issues of clinical utility, scientific
accuracy through validators, and pragmatic concern for
patient outcome. They do not, however, deal with the
issue discussed in Question 5, namely, that these can be
conflicting agendas, and that at times we effectively
prioritize one over the other.
Life never being as neat as one would like it, Allen
Frances and Joseph Pierre defeat my effort of a simple
d i c h o t o m ya n do c c u p yam i d dle ground between the
alternatives of giving up on a definition or trying to
improve it. Each argues for attempting a definition but
assures us that it will be a messy undertaking.
And that conclusion reminds me that in this search
for an adequate definition of mental disorder it would
be useful to invoke Wittgenstein’sn o t i o no ff a m i l y
resemblances. In discussing the essence of language or
language games, Wittgenstein writes:
Instead of producing something common to all that
we call language, I am saying that these phenomena
have no one thing in common which makes us use
the same word for all,-but that they are related to
one another in many ways. And it is because of this
relationship, or these relationships, that we call them
all “language.”...
I can think of no better expression to characterize
these similarities than “family resemblances"; for the
various resemblances between members of a family:
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament,
etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.-
And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family. [[44], pp. 31-
32].
The Wittgensteinian approach would represent the
middle ground of Frances and Pierre. In technical DSM
terminology, diagnoses don’t all share the same proper-
ties or validators; they resemble one another because
they share some. A diagnosis might have a place in the
nosology because of “historical accretion,” but might
lose it because it doesn’t meet standards of other cur-
rent validators. Examples are the paraphilias and con-
duct disturbances, both of which may lose their
admission tickets because of excessive normative valence
and inadequate internal distress. Borderline Personality
Disorder (now Borderline Type) is being retained pre-
sumably because descriptively it covers a lot of the
symptomatic morass otherwise not covered; but with its
known problems - heterogeneous presentation, excessive
comorbidity, lack of genetic or pathophysiologic founda-
tion - it will probably collapse and be carved up even-
tually for lack of real validators, i.e., not enough
validators in common with other members of the DSM
family. And finally, to underline Pierre’s point, distin-
guishing a validator from a value is an ambiguous
enterprise.
I readily acknowledge that the family resemblance
model will not satisfy those in search of a tighter defini-
tion of what constitutes a psychiatric disorder. Its main
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the absence of a tighter definition, will continue to
“define” - psychiatric disorders.
Commentary
Jerome C. Wakefield, Ph.D., D.S.W.
Silver School of Social Work and Department of Psy-
chiatry, New York University.
Al Frances’s powerful writings on psychiatric diagnosis
offer vigorous arguments about what should and should
not be diagnosed as psychiatrically disordered (not only
regarding DSM-5 overreaching; consider his adding the
clinical significance criterion to most diagnostic criteria
sets in DSM-IV). Yet, Frances vehemently denies that
there is any coherent concept underlying our judgments
o fw h a ti sa n di sn o tad i s o r d e r .T h i sm a ys a v eh i m
from a troublesome additional debate, but, as observed
by some commentators, it undercuts the coherence let
alone force of his critique of false-positive implications
of DSM-5 proposals.
Despite his disavowals, Frances’s arguments derive
their enormous power from an implicit reliance on
common intuitions about the concept of disorder as fail-
ure of biologically designed human nature. Sometimes
this implicit appeal emerges explicitly, as in Frances’s
[45] explanation of why he rejects DSM-5’sp r o p o s e d
approach to behavioral addiction: “The fundamental
problem is that repetitive (even if costly) pleasure seek-
ing is a ubiquitous part of human nature.... The evolu-
tion of our brains was strongly influenced by the fact
that, until recently, most people did not get to live very
long. Our hard brain wiring was built for short term
survival and propagating DNA- not for the longer term
planning that would be desirable now that we have
much lengthened lifespans.... This type of hard wiring
was clearly a winner in the evolutionary struggle when
life was “nasty, brutish, and short”. But it gets us into
constant trouble in a world where pleasure temptations
are everywhere and their long term negative conse-
quences should count for more than our brains are
wired to appreciate.”
Notice that Ken Kendler et al. [46], on the extreme
opposite side of the DSM-5 debate, implicitly appeal to
the same biological-design criterion when explaining
why fearful distress in reaction to real danger is not a
disorder: “An individual experiencing a panic attack
after just barely escaping a fatal climbing accident would
not be considered psychiatrically disordered because the
mechanism for panic attacks probably evolved to pre-
pare us for such situations of real danger” (p. 771).
So, what is the concept of disorder to which Frances
and Kendler implicitly appeal? The DSM’s definition of
disorder says that a disorder exists only when symptoms
are caused by a dysfunction in the individual and lead
to certain forms of harm, such as distress or impair-
ment. Observing that the concept of “dysfunction” was
left unelaborated and that distress or disability are not
the only harms that would warrant diagnosis, I proposed
what I labeled the “harmful dysfunction” (HD) analysis
of the concept of disorder [47-52].
The harmful dysfunction analysis maintains that the
concept of disorder has two components, a factual com-
ponent and a value component. To be a disorder, a con-
dition must satisfy both components. The value or
“harm” component refers to negative or undesirable or
harmful conditions, which applies to most symptomatic
conditions. Obviously, who gets to make the judgment
that a condition is harmful and on what grounds (espe-
cially in a pluralistic society) is a complex issue. But the
basic point is that no condition, even if a clear biological
malfunction, is a disorder if it is not considered in some
sense harmful to the individual or society. This is the
basis for the “clinical significance” requirement.
The factual component requires that the condition
must involve a failure of some mental mechanism to
perform one of its natural, biologically designed func-
tions. This is highly inferential and speculative and fuzzy
at this stage of knowledge of mental processes, but it is
t h ec o n c e p t u a lt a r g e ta tw h i c hw ea i mn o n e t h e l e s s .
Indeed, although both the notions of dysfunction and
harm are fuzzy concepts, as long as they determine a
range of clear cases on either side of the disorder/non-
disorder boundary, they can provide a cogent and useful
conceptual structure. Other useful categorical distinc-
tions - such as between night and day, or child and
adult - also have fuzzy boundaries, and pragmatic con-
siderations determine specifically where the dividing line
is drawn (see Question 1).
Today, we understand that human nature -specifically,
species-typical biological design – is due to evolution
through natural selection. So, dysfunction in the sense
relevant to judgments of medical disorder consists of
failure of internal mechanisms to perform evolved func-
tions. The “dysfunction” component of the analysis
means that, as far as the legitimate application of the
concept of disorder goes, disorder cannot be manufac-
tured from personal or social values and used as a cover
for “treatment” in service of social control. The “dys-
function” requirement places a limit on what can be
legitimately said to be a disorder, and explains why
many negative conditions are false positives.
How can we test this account of the generally shared
meaning of our distinction between disorder and non-
disorder? One way is to see if it is consistent with some
of our shared intuitions. Consider some simple examples
of conditions NOT considered disorders. Neither illiter-
acy nor an immigrant’s inability to speak the local lan-
guage are considered disorders, yet are terribly
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mental conditions (whereas dyslexia and aphasia are dis-
orders). Being a “night person” rather than a “morning
person” in a 9-to-5-structured culture is potentially dis-
advantageous, but considered a normal variation. Ferti-
lity when pregnancy is unwanted, pregnancy when
children are unwanted, and pain during childbirth are
all undesirable and potentially harmful conditions com-
monly treated by physicians but not considered disor-
ders. Neither debilitating fatigue after exertion nor sleep
- probably the single most massively impairing human
condition of all, rendering virtually everyone semi-paral-
yzed and periodically hallucinating for one-third of their
lifespans – are seen as disorders. Nor is delinquent
behavior by rambunctious teenagers or grief after a
loved one’s death.
The source of these classificatory judgments cannot be
reduced to personal or social values. Many of these non-
disordered conditions are personally and/or socially
undesirable. There is some additional element operating
here to explain these judgments. The common element
is that we consider all these conditions to be part of the
way human beings are designed to function, however
problematic they may be in our current environment.
Moreover, our intuitions are that entire cultures can
be incorrect about their disorder judgments. Victorians’
deeply held values and beliefs led them to classify mas-
turbation and female clitoral orgasm as disorders, some
ante-bellum Southern physicians considered slaves who
ran away from their masters to be psychiatrically disor-
dered ("drapetomania”), and Soviet psychiatrists treated
political dissidents as disordered. We believe that these
diagnostic judgments, although consistent with the
respective cultures’ values, were incorrect – not correct
“for them” and incorrect for us, but just plain wrong.
The factual component of “disorder” explains how this
can be so.
Now, consider the types of conditions to be found in
the DSM. At this point in the history of psychiatry, we
are about where Hippocrates was in formulating diag-
nostic categories. We know virtually nothing about the
underlying natures of mental mechanisms, but from cir-
cumstantial evidence and indirect inferences, we infer
what conditions are likely disorders. The superordinate
categories in the DSM - e.g., psychotic (thought) disor-
ders, anxiety disorders, mood (sadness/elation emotion)
disorders, sexual disorders, sleep disorders, and so on -
correspond to human systems about which we feel we
can pretty reliably infer that they are biologically
designed to operate in certain ways, and we can recog-
nize in a range of cases when something has gone
wrong - albeit with large fuzzy boundaries and large
ranges of uncertain cases given our ignorance.
Another way of assessing the HD analysis is by
whether it accomplishes certain important goals moti-
vating such an analysis. At a minimum, an analysis of
the concept of mental disorder should do four things:
(1) Explain widely shared classificatory judgments
about whether or not problematic conditions are
disorders.
(2) Explain why mental disorders are disorders in the
same sense as physical disorders, thus why psychia-
try is part of medicine.
(3) Explain the distinction between control of
socially undesirable mental conditions versus treat-
ment of mental disorder.
(4) Offer a fruitful way of thinking about research.
T h ef i r s tt h r e eg o a l sa r ea d d r e s s e da b o v e .A st o
research, the HD analysis explains the primary goal as
seeking to understand mental mechanisms and their
functions, and ultimately to identify and distinguish spe-
cific mental dysfunctions, yielding an “etiological”
classification.
Frances’s end run around the concept of disorder is
accomplished partly by his insisting on a scientific-
sounding “cost-benefit analysis” of each DSM-5 propo-
sal. This is a useful rubric for raising concerns and is
of course an improvement over wanton unreflective
pathologization. In drawing boundaries in some fuzzy
domains, the concept of disorder offers little guidance,
and perhaps cost-benefit analysis is all we can do.
However, generally reframing the process of deciding
whether to pathologize a condition as a cost-benefit
analysis, if taken seriously, is not only intellectually
unsupportable but dangerous, for the same reasons
why one would not want cost-benefit analysis to deter-
mine whether an accused was judged guilty in a trial -
namely, one loses any protection against social control
aspirations. After all, for all we know a careful cost-
benefit analysis might show that from a social perspec-
tive “treating” the Soviet dissidents for psychosis, slaves
who ran away for “drapetomania,” and women for
“pathological” clitoral orgasms was justifiable in the
respective social circumstances–but it was incorrect
use of diagnosis nonetheless, because the individuals
so labeled (in many cases) did not actually suffer from
disorders. Just as the health professions spring from
the concept of disorder, restraint of efforts to use the
health professions for social control also spring from
this crucial concept. To deny the existence and impor-
tance of the concept of mental disorder in a discussion
o ft h ev a l i d i t yo fd i a g n o s t i cc r i t e r i ai np s y c h i a t r yi s
sort of like a teacher denying there is knowledge or
ignorance before entering the classroom or a judge
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rendering a verdict.
I believe that, despite his misstep on the concept of
disorder, Frances is entirely correct in his relentless
focus on false positives as the Achilles heel of the DSM-
5 effort. The reason why this is so is not simply a matter
of preventing repetitions of the “false epidemics” of the
past due to criteria revisions. The deeper point is that
the very aspirations of the editors of DSM-5 for a para-
digm shift towards etiologically based diagnosis - a shift
for which we are not yet ready - depends in the long
run on distinguishing etiologies. That means distinguish-
ing different dysfunctions as well as distinguishing nor-
mal non-dysfunctions from dysfunctions that underlie
similar symptom presentations.
Because we are not yet ready to distinguish dysfunc-
tions, DSM-5 must remain theory neutral. However, a
serious conceptual-validity review could have allowed us
to do considerably better in distinguishing dysfunction
from likely non-dysfunction for many categories.
I n s t e a d ,t h eD S M - 5w o r kg r o u p sa r ee x p a n d i n gd i a g -
noses so that more individuals coming into consultation
can be labeled with a disorder, without careful concep-
tual analysis. Given this focus, the DSM-5 is likely to
take psychiatry further away from the editors’ stated
goal. The DSM-5 could have made progress towards
etiologically grounded categories by eliminating some of
the false positives that afflict the manual’so p e r a t i o n a l
criteria sets, placing them under separate V Code cate-
gories. With false positives swamping many categories,
psychiatric science will continue to flounder, unable to
distinguish dysfunction etiologies because its criteria
cannot in many cases even distinguish internal dysfunc-
tion where something has gone wrong from intense but
normal biologically designed reactions to events.
Commentary: Definitions of “Mental Disorder:” Elusion
and Illusion
Warren Kinghorn, M.D.
Duke University Department of Psychiatry.
The definitions of “mental disorder” which have
appeared in each edition of the DSM since DSM-III
(hereafter referred to as the “DSM definitions”) are both
carefully crafted and widely ignored. Pioneered by Spit-
zer and Endicott as a means for demarcating (true)
mental disorders from non-pathological conditions in
the wake of controversy over the status of homosexual-
ity in DSM-II [53], the DSM definitions have from the
beginning, and despite copious qualification and caveat,
proved controversial and largely irrelevant to the practi-
cal use of the DSM. Specific criticisms of the DSM defi-
nitions, such as their circular use of “clinically
significant,” are by now commonplace [54,55]. The
DSM-5 Task Force has proposed an updated definition
which seeks to improve on prior definitions and which
emphasizes the pragmatic and method-driven nature of
psychiatric nosology [43]. The DSM-5 proposal is
worthy of sustained critical consideration which I do
not offer here. In this brief account, rather, I wish to
offer three reasons why future editions of the DSM
should not include a definition of “mental disorder.” In
each case, I argue, the DSM definitions seem to contri-
bute to a certain good, but this is illusion.
First, the DSM definitions seem only to describe the
terrain of what is already considered “mental disorder,”
innocuously supplying rough logical boundaries to psy-
chiatric praxis without limiting or shaping it. But this is
an illusion. Although, as Sadler [54] points out, the
DSM definitions have not in practice influenced the way
that new diagnoses are incorporated into the DSM, they
do provide a regulative language for how one speaks
about the mental disorders that are already there. Ques-
tions, for example, about whether major depressive dis-
order most properly inheres in an individual or in a
group (or even in a society; [56]) run counter to the
methodological individualism of the DSM, enshrined in
its definitions of mental disorder, and are therefore diffi-
cult to ask without bringing the entire DSM project into
question. This should not be the case; it is precisely by
excluding useful questions that the DSM renders itself
an obstacle to nosological advance rather than a catalyst
to it.
Second, the DSM definitions of mental disorder seem
to demarcate a safe conceptual territory within human
life and experience within which the medical model can
properly rule. The unspoken but nonetheless persuasive
model seems to run something like: Why should a psy-
chiatric technology (medication, ECT, manual-driven
psychotherapy, etc.) be deployed within this situation? A:
Because it’s a mental disorder, and one uses psychiatric
treatments for mental disorders. Q: But how do we know
that this is a mental disorder? A: Well, it’si nt h eDSM,
and besides, it fits into the conceptual space which the
DSM defines as “mental disorder.” But this, too, is illu-
sory and deceptive. The deployment of psychiatric tech-
nology is not justified because a particular condition is
demarcated as “mental disorder” but because, after all
goods are weighed and all options considered, the use of
technology is prudentially indicated. Whether the condi-
tion is classified as “mental disorder” has little to do
with this particular question. Although the DSM defini-
tions importantly exclude certain situations (e.g., pri-
mary social deviance) from the medical model, it would
be better for the DSM simply to stipulate these ethical
commitments rather than to embed them within the
definition of “mental disorder.” Moreover, the fact that a
certain condition satisfies the DSM definitions does not
serve as prima facie justification of the deployment of
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collude in any contrary assumption.
Finally, the DSM definitions seem to focus diverse
mental health professionals on a common moral project.
Clinicians may disagree about etiology and treatment,
that is, but can at least join together in stamping out
“mental disorder” as described in the generously broad
DSM definitions. But this also is illusion, proved empiri-
c a l l yt ob es ob yt h ef a i l u r eo fe v e r yDSM definition to
achieve widespread consensus and destined to be proved
again in the inevitable failure of the DSM-5 definition.
The reason for this is not that the definitions are poorly
crafted (quite the opposite) but that such consensus,
within the contemporary mental health landscape, is not
a conceptual possibility. For example, with regard to the
DSM-5 proposal - the best definition to date - particular
clinicians are certain to reject not only nosological indi-
vidualism but also the foundational assumptions behind
“underlying psychobiological dysfunction,” the exclusion
of expectable responses to common stressors and losses,
and the distinction between “behavioral” and “psycholo-
gical.” Furthermore, even if consensus on a formal defi-
nition were attainable, it would accomplish little since
agreement about “dysfunction” and “impairment” and
“deviance” can be no stronger than correlative agree-
ment about proper human functioning in a particular
situation (such that, e.g., what one clinician judges as
impairment, another judges as unreasonable expecta-
tion). There is, unfortunately, no more agreement about
p r o p e rh u m a nf u n c t i o nt h a na bout the (closely related)
nature of “mental health.”
Crafting a definition of mental disorder is a useful
thought-experiment for psychiatric nosologists and
debating such definitions is great fun for the philosophi-
cally-minded. But in a document as influential and gen-
erally accessible as the DSM, such definitions elude and
mislead more than they illumine. They should therefore
be honorably retired.
Commentary
Joseph Pierre, M.D.
UCLA Department of Psychiatry.
Developing an ironclad definition of mental illness (or
for that matter the more general notion of disease) is
indeed a daunting task [43,57-59]. Most attempts at a
medical model definition are based on some variation
on the concept of “something that has gone wrong bio-
logically with an individual that results in distress or
functional impairment,” but problems with this
approach quickly emerge. First, we have no firm expla-
nations for what’s biologically wrong in mental disorders
[57] - no “underlying psychobiological dysfunctions” [43]
have yet been elucidated (and as the joke goes, in the
few cases where such “lesions” have been identified, they
transform from psychiatric disorders into neurologic dis-
eases). Second, the concepts of “wrongness” and “dys-
function” are unavoidably value-laden [57,60], while
“distress” and “suffering” are subjective and relativistic
[43,61]. Third, distinguishing between mental illness and
“problems of living,”“ expectable responses to common
stressors” (or extraordinary stressors), and “social
deviance or conflicts with society” is at best challenging
[43], given the inextricable, reciprocal relationship
between individuals and their environments/cultures
[58]. Therefore, in the absence of lab tests to detect bio-
logical lesions, psychiatric diagnosis inevitably rests
upon some kind of “judgment call” on the part of a clin-
ician and the inescapable conclusion that “no definition
perfectly specifies precise boundaries for the concept of
‘mental disorder [43].’”
As suggested earlier, clinicians do not in general fret
over what does or does not constitute a disease. If, for
example, a patient’s arm is broken in a car accident, a
doctor doesn’t lose sleep pondering whether this repre-
sents “broken bone disorder” or simply an expected
response to an environmental stressor - the bone is set
and the arm is casted. For psychiatrists, ever since
Freud’s development of “The Talking Cure,” the busi-
ness of psychiatry has increasingly shifted from asylum
care of patients with psychosis to outpatient treatment
of the “worried well” [62]. Likewise, we now live in a
society that regards the attainment of happiness as a
worthwhile goal in life, if not an entitlement [63].
Therefore, mental disorder or not, clinicians working in
“mental health” see it as their calling to try to improve
the lives of whomever walks through their office door
seeking help.
B u tc l i n i c a ld e c i s i o n sa r en o tt h eo n l yd e c i s i o n st h a t
hinge upon diagnosis. The underappreciated challenge
to defining a mental disorder in the real world stems
from the many different questions that are ultimately
being asked of diagnosis:
Should “disorder X” be treated?
What is the best way to treat “disorder X"?
Should screening for “disorder X” be implemented in
the community in the interest of treatment and
prevention?
Should special school services be offered for children
with “disorder X?”
Should insurance companies reimburse for care
based on “disorder X?”
Should research funding be granted to study “disor-
der X?”
Should a patient population based on “disorder X”
be selected for etiologic research?
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mitted a crime be sentenced to prison or to involun-
tary psychiatric treatment?
The far-reaching implications of these questions ren-
der the distinction between mental illness and normality
far more significant than when considered in a clinical
vacuum, especially in the era of rationed healthcare ser-
vices, insurance reimbursement, and competitive
research funding. For the clinician and patient, erring
on the side of assigning, or receiving, a diagnosis of a
mental disorder has become incentivized, but future
economic and policy decisions may necessitate a more
conservative threshold for defining mental illness [61].
Therefore, the many questions asked of diagnosis cannot
be answered by any single definition of mental illness, or
by simply referring to the DSM. Instead, and in particu-
lar as DSM-5 embraces the concept of diagnostic spec-
tra in which the borders between pathology and
normality are stretched, wide-ranging consideration and
context-specific analyses by clinicians, patients and their
families, researchers, DSM architects, and policy-makers
will be a vital, ongoing process that shapes the fate of
modern psychiatry.
Commentary
John Chardavoyne, M.D.
Yale University Department of Psychiatry.
How should American psychiatry define “mental dis-
order?” There is a varied array of dimensions that are
emphasized in the various definitions, including the bio-
logical basis of psychiatric illness; the behavioral mani-
festations; the severity of impairment; the level of
distress; and the differentiation between pathology ver-
sus normalcy. In this commentary I will provide exam-
ples of these different aspects, suggest reasons for the
confusion, and propose the beginning of a more inte-
grated approach.
First, let’s review elements of a few of the definitions
that have been proposed. The DSM-IV definition
emphasizes explicitly that it characterizes disorders, not
people; that there are biological, psychological, or beha-
vioral dysfunctions that result in a psychological or
behavioral syndrome; this creates impairment or dis-
tress; it is not a result from discord between the indivi-
dual and society; and that these problems are not
culturally-sanctioned. http://www.DSM5.org/Propose-
dRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=465#. The
proposed changes for DSM-V include that there is psy-
chobiological dysfunction that results in a psychological
or behavioral syndrome; that there is evidence of dis-
tress or impairment in functioning; that the response is
not expectable and not culturally-sanctioned; it is not a
result from discord between the individual and society;
and that there is diagnostic validity and utility. http://
www.DSM5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevi-
sion.aspx?rid=465. According to the National Alliance
on Mental Illness, mental illness is defined with an
emphasis on the medical model. http://www.nami.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_Men-
tal_Illness/About_Mental_Illness.htm. The International
Classification of Diseases-10 definition highlights the
symptoms. http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/
bluebook.pdf.
These definitions reflect the difficulties in adequately
d e s c r i b i n gt h en a t u r eo fa“mental disorder.” They
reflect the uncertainty about how biology results in psy-
chiatric manifestations and vice versa and difficulties in
the following: the way to differentiate pathology from
normalcy, how to categorize the syndromes, and the
location of the source of dysfunction. Along these lines,
a chief concern is the emphasis on overt behaviors to
classify mental disorders. Despite how patients report
subjective experiences and distress, the overt behaviors
have been used as the major indicators of disorder. The
difficulties related to quantifying the first-person subjec-
tive experience compared to the third-person objective
observations (overt behaviors) manifest here. The Psy-
chodynamic Diagnostic Manual reintroduces the subjec-
tive experience into assessment [64].
This begs the question of the direction that psychiatry
wants to go. Do psychiatrists want to be able to treat an
individual with manic symptoms and also someone with
intimacy problems? Presumably the former would have
more behavioral markers than the latter. However, how
can one quantify the suffering of one versus the other?
Simply because there are not as many behavioral mani-
festations, does that mean that the person is not suffer-
ing sufficiently to warrant treatment by a psychiatrist?
Equally important, does that suggest that insurance
companies continue to determine reimbursement for
treatment based on behaviors without considering level
of suffering and other factors that contribute towards
psychological dysfunction like thoughts, feelings, and
relationships?
Another element to consider when defining “mental
disorder” is the fact that there is a person foremost who
has the signs and symptoms of a mental disorder. As
referenced earlier, the DSM-IV states that the definition
focuses on the disorder and not the person. http://www.
DSM5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.
aspx?rid=465#. This portends various problems because
psychiatrists treat people. This fact can be lost in this
age of fifteen-minute medication checks and insurance
pressures. The essential aspect of the help is the rela-
tionship so acknowledgement of the patient as a person
with an illness should be added to the definition of
mental disorder. “... When therapists apply manualized
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sing the complex person who experiences the symptoms
and without attending to the therapeutic relationship
that supports the treatment, therapeutic results are
short-lived and rates of remission are high.” [64]Admit-
tedly, what complicates this issue is our lack of under-
standing of how brain processes (ion fluxes,
neurotransmission, etc) result in consciousness, inten-
tionality, thoughts, and thes u b j e c t i v ee x p e r i e n c eo f
emotions and how these psychological states affect brain
processes. Along this vain, perhaps the use of “mental”
should be reconsidered because it implies, intentionally
or not, the separation of mind and brain. Perhaps
“neuro-mental” could be considered? The definition pos-
sibly could begin like this: “An individual (with hopes,
dreams, disappointments, and feelings like his treaters)
is considered to have a neuro-mental disorder when....”
The definition of a mental disorder will evolve over
time as our knowledge advances and cultures evolve. It
may be worthwhile to recognize that a definition will be
merely a synthesis of the various dialectical poles and
will require repeated adjustments over time. If we’re
willing to change our understanding of the definition,
then perhaps we’ll be willing to better understand our
patients.
Commentary: The Difficulties of Defining a Mental
Disorder in DSM-III
Hannah S. Decker, Ph.D.
University of Houston.
I am commenting on this question as a historian of
psychiatry who is writing a book on the making of
DSM-III.
The first two DSMs in 1952 and 1968 eschewed a
definition of mental disorder befitting their modest ori-
gins from nomenclatures that served primarily “the [sta-
tistical] needs and case loads of public mental hospitals”
[[65], p. vi]. But the editor of the third edition (1980),
Robert L. Spitzer, had more ambitious goals for the
manual resulting in a volume that was over three times
the size of DSM-II and had dozens of new diagnoses. It
was Spitzer’s plan to include in DSM-III a definition of
“mental illness” as a subset of “medical illness.” Circum-
stances forced him to abandon this type of definition,
but there is a definition of “mental disorder” in DSM-
III, prefaced by the familiar caveat, “there is no satisfac-
tory definition that specifies precise boundaries for the
concept ‘mental disorder’” [[66], p. 5].
Spitzer wanted to establish that, without any doubt,
psychiatry was a part of medicine. He had initially
thought seriously about mental disorders even before he
was appointed the head of the Task Force. In 1973, he
had brokered the removal of the diagnosis of homosexu-
ality as a mental disorder from DSM-II, and the
controversy surrounding the event sensitized him to the
subject of what constituted a mental disorder. He soon
found impediments to his goal of establishing definitions
of medical and mental disorder in DSM-III. Still, at
every turn he persevered because he envisioned the issu-
ance of the new diagnostic manual as having intellectual
goals far larger than its being a diagnostic classification.
Spitzer wanted DSM-III to play a role in combating the
anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and early ‘70s
and to refute critics such as Thomas Szasz who said
mental illness was a myth.
I would like to spell out briefly the obstacles that lay
in the path of an agreed-upon definition of a mental dis-
order. At the annual meeting of the American Psychia-
tric Association in May 1976, Spitzer and Jean Endicott,
a close colleague on the DSM-III Task Force, put forth
their definitions of medical and mental disorders. The
reaction was quite negative. As Spitzer later reported:
“Some questioned the need and wisdom of having any
definition. Many argued that the definition proposed
was too restrictive, and if officially adopted, would have
the potential for limiting the appropriate activities of
our profession... they also felt that it was out of keeping
with trends in medicine that emphasize the continuity
of health and illness” [[67], p. 16]. (This continues to be
an important question in current debates over what
d i a g n o s e ss h o u l db ei nD S M - 5 .A l l e nF r a n c e s ,i np a r t i -
cular, has argued against pathologizing what he sees as
aspects of normality, “everyday incapacity,” in his
words.)
Then, Spitzer encountered strenuous opposition from
psychologists to the notion that mental disorders were
medical disorders. This was a turf issue, with the psy-
chologists fearing that they would lose the right to treat
mental disorders if they were defined as medical. In
June 1976, a conference was held in St. Louis on “Criti-
cally Examining DSM-III in Midstream.” Dr. Maurice
Lorr, representing the American Psychological Associa-
tion, “expressed the view that mental disorders (as medi-
cal disorders) should be limited to those conditions for
which a biological etiology or pathophysiology could be
demonstrated.” In addition, just two months earlier, a
former president of the American Psychological Associa-
tion had been quite blunt in expressing his view that
DSM-III was “turning every human problem into a dis-
ease, in anticipation of the shower of health plan gold
that is over the horizon” [[67], p. 36].
In spite of these disagreements, Spitzer, as was his
wont, did not surrender easily. He returned the next
year to bolster his arguments. This was at the yearly
meeting of the American Psychopathological Associa-
tion, an organization of preeminent American psychia-
trists dedicated to research on human behavior. In 1977
it devoted its annual conference to “Critical Issues in
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presented retooled definitions of both medical and men-
tal disorders, but Spitzer, as an editor of the 1978 pub-
lished proceedings of the conference, now took the
opportunity to remind his readers of the blows psychia-
try had endured in the 1960s and early ‘70s: “The very
concept of psychiatric illness has been under consider-
able attack in recent years. This attack has largely
depended upon studies derived from the social sciences.
S o m eh a v et a k e nt h es t a n dt h a tw h a ta r ec a l l e dm e n t a l
illnesses are simply those particular groups of behaviors
that certain societies have considered deviant and repre-
hensible.” Spitzer believed that this rejection of the
legitimacy of psychiatry was partly owed to the fact that
“no generally agreed upon definition of mental illness
has been propounded that is not open to the criticisms
of cultural relativism” [[68], p. 5].
In addition to his conviction that DSM-III, with its
new diagnostic criteria, would bring diagnostic reliability
to psychiatry, Spitzer conceived of the new DSM as a
weapon that could repel psychiatry’s cultural challen-
gers. The new manual would thus have a potential of
historical proportions. Nevertheless, although Spitzer
labored mightily to develop “mental illness” as a subset
of “medical illness,” he was ultimately forced to bow
both to the opinions of his psychiatric colleagues, who
had philosophical and practical objections to his defini-
tion, and to the demands of the psychologists that men-
tal illnesses be labeled “mental disorders.” The upshot
was that mental disorders did not get to be defined as
medical disorders.
The attempts of Robert Spitzer–a psychiatrist of con-
siderable accomplishment in many areas of the profes-
sion–to establish a definition of a mental disorder,
illustrate the complexities of arriving at one that is intel-
lectually satisfying, clinically useful, and practically
acceptable. Nevertheless, he did include a definition of
mental disorder in DSM-III under the category of “Basic
Concepts” [[66], pp. 5-6]. DSM-IV [[69], pp. xxi-xxii],
with some changes, essentially preserved Spitzer’s defini-
tion, which also forms the basis of the definition
planned for DSM-5 [70] (See also Stein et al [43]. The
individuals addressing this latest revision include the
habitual warning: “No definition perfectly specifies pre-
cise boundaries for the concept of either ‘medical disor-
der’ or ‘mental/psychiatric disorder’” [70].
Allen Frances responds: Mental Disorder Defies Definition
Humpty Dumpty: “When I choose a word it means just
what I choose it to mean”
When it comes to defining the term “mental disorder”
or figuring out which conditions qualify, we enter
Humpty’s world of shifting, ambiguous, and
idiosyncratic word usages. This is a fundamental weak-
ness of the whole field of mental health.
Many crucial problems would be much less proble-
m a t i ci fo n l yi tw e r ep o s s i b l et of r a m ea no p e r a t i o n a l
definition of mental disorder that really worked. Nosolo-
gists could use it to guide decisions on which aspects of
human distress and malfunction should be considered
psychiatric- and which should not. Clinicians could use
it when deciding whether to diagnose and treat a patient
on the border with normality. A meaningful definition
would clear up the great confusion in the legal system
where matters of great consequence often rest on
whether a mental disorder is present or absent.
Alas, I have read dozens of definitions of mental dis-
order (and helped to write one) and I can’t say that any
have the slightest value whatever. Historically, condi-
tions have become mental disorders by accretion and
practical necessity, not because they met some indepen-
dent set of operationalized definitional criteria. Indeed,
the concept of mental disorder is so amorphous, pro-
tean, and heterogeneous that it inherently defies defini-
tion. This is a hole at the center of psychiatric
classification
And the specific mental disorders certainly constitute
a hodge podge. Some describe short term states, others
lifelong personality. Some reflect inner misery, others
bad behavior. Some represent problems rarely or never
seen in normals, others are just slight accentuations of
the everyday. Some reflect too little control, others too
much. Some are quite intrinsic to the individual, others
are defined against varying and changing cultural mores
and stressors. Some begin in infancy, others in old age.
Some affect primarily thought, others emotions, yet
others behaviors, others interpersonal relations, and
there are complex combinations of all of these. Some
seem more biological, others more psychological or
social.
If there is a common theme it is distress and disabil-
ity, but these are very imprecise and nonspecific markers
on which to hang a definition. Ironically, the one defini-
tion of mental disorder that does have great and abiding
practical meaning is never given formal status because it
is tautological and potentially highly self serving. It
would go something like “Mental disorder is what clini-
cians treat and researchers research and educators teach
and insurance companies pay for.” In effect, this is his-
torically how the individual mental disorders made their
way into the system.
The definition of mental disorder has been elastic and
follows practice rather than guides it. The greater the
number of mental health clinicians, the greater the
number of life conditions that work their way into
becoming disorders. There were only six disorders listed
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teenth century, now there are close to three hundred.
Society also has a seemingly insatiable capacity (even
hunger) to accept and endorse newly defined mental
disorders that help to define and explain away its emer-
ging concerns.
As a result, psychiatry is subject to recurring diagnos-
tic fads. Were DSM5 to have its way we would have a
wholesale medicalization of everyday incapacity (mild
memory loss with aging); distress (grief, mixed anxiety
depression); defects in self control (binge eating); eccen-
tricity (psychotic risk); irresponsibility(hypersexuality);
and even criminality (rape, statutory rape). Remarkably,
none of these newly proposed diagnoses even remotely
pass the standard loose definition of “what clinician’s
treat”.N o n eo ft h e s e“mental disorders” has an estab-
lished treatment with proven efficacy. Each is so early in
development as to be no more than “what researchers
research” - a concoction of highly specialized research
interests.
We must accept that our diagnostic classification is
the result of historical accretion and accident without
any real underlying system or scientific necessity. The
rules for entry have varied over time and have rarely
been very rigorous. Our mental disorders are no more
than fallible social constructs.
Despite all these limitations, the definitions of mental
disorders contained in the DSM’s are necessary and do
achieve great practical utility. The DSM provides a com-
mon language for clinicians, a tool for researchers, and
a bridge across the clinical/research interface. It offers a
textbook of information for educators and students. It
contains the coding system for statistical, insurance, and
administrative purposes. DSM diagnoses also often play
an important role in both civil and criminal legal pro-
ceedings. The DSM system is imperfect, but
indispensable.
It is undoubtedly a failing on my part, but I find
myself unable to take much interest in efforts to define
mental disorder. My too practical temperament prefers
to spend my too limited time on earth attending to con-
crete and soluble problems and studiously avoids the
abstract and the insoluble. Defining mental disorder in a
useful way clearly lies above my intellectual pay grade.
This is not to say that the question is uninteresting or
unimportant. Would that there were a workable defini-
tion of mental disorder. We could then comfortably
decide which of the proposed mental disorders need be
included in the DSM, which aspects of human suffering
and deviance are best left out. We could also come to a
ready judgment about each individual potential ‘patient’-
who best qualifies for diagnosis and treatment, who is
best left to his own devices.
Alas, however, the sheep and the goats refuse to
declare themselves in any convenient and discernible
way. The definitions of mental disorder offered here
make perfect sense in the abstract, but provide no gui-
dance on how to make concrete decisions. They do not
tell us, for example, whether mixed anxiety depression
or binge eating or the early forgetting of advanced years
are disorders or facts of life. They do not guide us in
diagnosing the many people who populate the fuzzy
boundary between mental disorder and normality.
Seeing no practical consequence, I have no opinion on
the fine points of definition- since these seem to be of
only academic interest. Mental disorder is (like ‘disease’
and ‘obscenity’ or ‘love’) something you hope you can
spot when you see it, but by implicit rules that inher-
ently are poorly defined and ever shifting.
Reply to Dr Wakefield
If anyone in the world could usefully define mental dis-
order, it would be Jerry Wakefield. He has tried long,
hard, skillfully, even brilliantly and has come up with a
definition that works extremely well on paper. His
“harmful dysfunction” and evolutionary perspective pro-
vide the best possible abstract definition of mental dis-
order. The problem is that Dr Wakefield’s definition is
not operational in a way that provides guidance on the
two questions that most count: 1) Is this proposed new
diagnosis a mental disorder that should be included in
the official nomenclature? 2) Does this person have suf-
ficient psychiatric problems to warrant a diagnosis of
mental disorder? Unfortunately, neither question lends
itself to his definitional solution. As Dr Wakefield him-
self points out, “both the notions of dysfunction and
harm are fuzzy concepts” that are only useful to “deter-
mine a range of clear cases on either side of the disor-
der/nondisorder boundary.” We are left to settle the
crucial and frequent tough fuzzy boundary questions in
what remains a necessarily unsatisfactory, ad hoc, and
often idiosyncratic manner.
Dr Wakefield seems to accept the necessity of my less
abstract “cost/benefit analysis” approach for reducing
the reckless DSM 5 diagnostic exuberance at the fuzzy
boundary with normality. But he goes on rightly to criti-
cize its susceptibility to misuse in the service of social
control or economic manipulation. These issues are
taken up in more detail in question #4 on the limita-
tions of pragmatics in framing the diagnostic system.
Dr Wakefield and I agree completely on the most
important question facing psychiatry today- the risk of
false positives and excessive treatment. Diagnostic infla-
tion has been a huge problem in the way DSM IV has
been used. It will be greatly amplified by the many new
high prevalence diagnoses being suggested for DSM 5.
Unfortunately, no available definition of mental disorder
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nostic standards and drug company advertising.
Response to Dr Kinghorn
Ia g r e et h a tt h eD S M ’s gain little from attempting to
provide an abstract definition of mental disorder and
that having a useless definition may be worse than offer-
ing no definition at all. Also, let’s remember that we are
not alone in being definitionally challenged- there is
really no good operational definition in medicine for
“disease” or “illness.”
Response to Dr Pierre
I agree completely with Dr Pierre’s eloquent critique of
the definitions of mental disorder and fully endorse his
concern that such consequential decisions rest on such
a fragile tissue. It will be important to get the widest
input on all the crucial questions raised by Dr Pierre.
We can’t rely on any definition of mental disorder, nor
can we trust the wisdom of experts on that disorder or
of any single professional association. The decisions
about what constitutes a mental disorder require the
same safety care as the FDA devotes before allowing the
introduction of a new drug.
Reply to Dr Chardavoyne
I understand Dr Chardavoyne’sr e g r e tt h a tD S Mm a y
seem to lose the person in its effort to define the disor-
der. I just don’t see a solution within the diagnostic sys-
tem- which necessarily has to focus on symptom
similarities, rather than the particularities and idiosyn-
crasies that make each of us who we are. Holding fast
to the person is the crucial task of every clinician, but it
is not something the DSM can help with.
Reply to Dr Decker
Hannah Decker does us a great service by recalling and
recording attempts to define mental disorder. I am
afraid, however, that this is a situation in which knowing
a problematic past is insufficient to avoid repeating it.
There will always be a strong desire to define ‘mental
disorder’ because it is so important in setting the
boundary with normality. But all efforts at universal
definition will fail because the concept is so inherently
fuzzy and situation bound. The only consolation is that
‘medical illness’ is equally vague and hard to define.
Conclusion
The two questions covered in this article form a natural
pair. How you define mental disorder (Question 2) will
certainly depend on what you think mental disorders
are and how we are able to know about them (Question
1). I will briefly summarize the discussion developed in
these questions and save a larger review for the general
conclusion.
As indicated above in the General Introduction, the
startling failure of research to validate the DSM
categories of DSM-III and DSM-IV has led to a concep-
tual crisis in our nosology: what exactly is the status of
DSM diagnoses? Do they identify real diseases, or are
they merely convenient (and at time arbitrary) ways of
grouping psychiatric symptoms? These are the issues
dealt with in Question 1, framed in the umpire meta-
phor introduced by Allen Frances in his “DSM in Philo-
sophyland” piece published in Bulletin 1 and
commented on at length in Bulletin 2. The commen-
taries in this article roughly follow the positions of the
five imagined umpires, although, as explained above,
most of us will not restrict ourselves to a purist version
of one of the umpires. Indeed, Frances himself, while
stating a clear point of view, acknowledges that each
umpire position captures a bit of the truth.
The first two commentaries address Question 1 in a
broad way, commenting on the process of deciding
about the merits of the various positions. Peter Zachar
and Stephen Lobello are scholars who take their baseball
seriously and weave the metaphor into a complex analy-
sis in which their pragmatic (practical kinds) perspective
subsumes all the umpires, including the pragmatic
fourth umpire. In her commentary Claire Pouncey
doesn’t quite assume a position but provides a clear pre-
sentation of the differences among the first three
umpires. She begins with the clarification that the
umpire question involves both ontology and epistemol-
ogy: what is there, and can I know it. Umpire 1 is a
Strong Realist - both an ontological realist and an epis-
temological realist. Umpire 2 is a Strong Realist/Weak
Constructivist - an ontological realist and an epistemo-
logical less-than-realist. Umpire 3 is a Strong Construc-
tivist - an ontological anti-realist and an epistemological
anti-realist.
In his commentary Nassir Ghaemi offers a spirited
defense of a realist, first-umpire position, challenging
those who don’t accept the reality of mental illnesses as
to what they’re doing treating patients. I am calling him
a first umpire, but he rejects the umpire metaphor,
offering in its stead Kenneth Kendler’s notion of “episte-
mic iteration.”
The next three commentators assume some variation
on the “nominalist” second umpire position. Michael
Cerullo invokes the naturalist/normativist debate, a dis-
tinction that echoes Jerome Wakefield’sh a r m f u ld y s -
function notion of psychiatric disorders. Cerullo argues
that all diseases, including psychiatric disorders, have
natural and normativist aspects, although some lean
more toward the naturalist dimension and others toward
the normativist dimension.
In his contribution Jerome Wakefield follows with a
thorough presentation of his well-known harmful dys-
function understanding of mental disorders. For
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umpire in a humble realist 1.5 position - nominalism
with a tilt toward realism.
Finally, Joseph Pierre invokes the fate of the planet
Pluto to point to the reality of things studied by science
and reminds us of the biological reality of mental disor-
ders; but, acknowledging the uncertainties of our knowl-
edge, he assumes the second umpire position. Like the
others in the second umpire group, he notes that some
psychiatric disorders make more claim on a first umpire
stance than others.
Gary Greenberg boldly assumes the third umpire posi-
tion, even invoking Samuel Johnson’s kick in a face-off
with Ghaemi’s use of the kick to defend the first umpire.
Greenberg argues that the human interest is so powerful
in determining what counts as disease and what does
not that honesty drives us to the constructivist stance.
In his commentary Harold Pincus elaborates the very
diverse ways in which concepts of mental disorders are
used by an assortment of user groups, leading him to
emphasize the fourth umpire, pragmatist, position
toward psychiatric conditions. He argues cogently that
validity as we now know it will not be a meaningful
concept in the future.
Finally, with his usual energy and without any indica-
tion of retreat, Thomas Szasz comfortably assumes the
position of fifth umpire and reviews the stance toward
psychiatric disorders he familiarized us with fifty years
ago.
And still finally, in a reflection that probably belongs
best with the fifth umpire, Elliott Martin argues that the
insurance industry has so co-opted the nosology that we
might consider it the only umpire in the game.
In his response to the commentaries on Question 1,
Allen Frances begins by noting that “[n]one of the five
umpires is completely right all of the time. And none is
totally wrong all of the time. Each has a season and
appropriate time at the plate.” He then proceeds to a
historical perspective, noting that in the heyday of biolo-
gical psychiatry forty years ago, Umpire 1, 3, and 5 were
ascendant. On the one hand, the biological psychiatrists
were confident that the realist position of Umpire 1
w o u l dp r e v a i l .A n do nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h e yw e r ec h a l -
lenged by a broad range of skeptics occupying the posi-
tions of the Umpires 3 and 5. In Frances’ account that
has all changed. Chastened by the failures of biological
psychiatric to produce, but convinced of the reality of
psychiatric illness, we as a majority have gravitated
toward the position of Umpire 2 - there is certainly psy-
chiatric illness, but the categories of DSM-III and IV
may not have carved those infamous joints correctly.
Frances offers a guarded defense of the categories, none-
theless, arguing that, until further science has settled the
issue of what are valid categories, the current ones serve
a useful function of organizing the clinical phenomena
which we confront in our work. The pragmatic Umpire
4 thus has a say in our current efforts to diagnose.
“Mental disorders are no more and no less than con-
structs. And Umpire 4 is quick to point out that they
are very useful constructs.” Frances ends on an optimis-
t i cn o t et h a tw i t hm o r es c i e n t i f i cc l a r i t yi nt h ef u t u r e ,
we can anticipate that Umpire 1 will gradually assume
prominence over Umpire 2.
With the second question, definition, Frances can cer-
tainly claim more experience that most of us because of
the time he put in grappling with this question in DSM-
IV. His dissatisfaction withh i so w nw o r kp r o d u c t ,a n d
his skepticism about ever getting it right are certainly
revealing - and consistent with his response to the first
question. He points to the heterogeneity of what gets
called a mental disorder, as well as to the unavoidable
fact that many have been admitted to the club through
the distinctly unscientific process of historical accretion.
All that said, he argues that the DSM categories serve a
very important role in facilitating communication
among mental health professional and are thus neces-
sary, however imperfect and imprecise. He concludes on
a note of flagging interest in settling this question.
The commentators have stretched themselves to the
imaginable extremes in tackling this question. The
majority, along with Frances, view the DSM as a very
motley assortment of behaviors and states of mind, and
they see the DSM definition as trying to accommodate
what we in fact treat, as opposed to leading us to decide
what we should treat. The exception is Jerome Wake-
field, who has argued persuasively for some time - and
rehearses the main features of his argument here - that
we can provide a clear of definition of mental disorder
with the notion of harmful dysfunction. This is a defini-
tion that covers both the scientific and normative
aspects of mental disorder, and that purports to guide
us rather than follow us in our practice.
The commentaries at the other end of the spectrum
start with Warren Kinghorn, who argues that since the
DSM definition accomplishes nothing, even what it
minimally claims to accomplish - organizing the terrain
and establishing common goals of practice - we should
acknowledge that we don’tu s ei t ,d o n ’t need it, and
should just retire it.
Joseph Pierre offers another argument for the impossi-
bility of developing an adequate definition - poor
science, value intrusion, ever broadening parameters of
practice - and also reminds us that general medicine
does quite well without an official definition. In spite of
his cogent argument for the failed project of definition,
he appears to stop short of Kinghorn’s recommendation,
and without mustering Frances’ defense, appears to be
in favor of having the definition, however inadequate.
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that an official definition can have significant conse-
quences for the field of psychiatry.
John Chardavoyne, makes a plea for escaping the
inadequate science by reorienting the definition away
from the disease and back to the person. In doing this
he retains a definition but stands somewhat outside the
debate that has engaged Frances and the other
commentators.
In a final commentary Hannah Decker takes a look
back and reviews Robert Spitzer’s struggles to develop a
definition of mental illness for DSM-III - a commentary
that prompts Allen Frances to remark that this is a
situation in which even a thorough examination of the
past may not improve our performance in the present.
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